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ABSTRACT 
The difficulty of financing agriculture in rural China has hindered the development 
of China’s rural economy for a long time. The conflicts between the high risk and low 
profit of farmers has led to a significant imbalance between credit demand and supply. 
Therefore, understanding the characteristics and preference of credit demand for farmer 
households is an important problem to solve.  
In this study, we mainly focus on demand-side of credit in rural China and aims to 
understand attribute preferences and the willingness of farmers to pay for credit. In 
chapter one, we introduce the background of current issues in rural finance. In chapter 
three, implementation of experiments including identifying attributes and levels, 
creating the experiment design and designing a complimentary survey provided in 
detail. We introduce how we did two experiments in five provinces in rural China. After 
deciding to select interest rate, term of loan, type of loan, type of repayment, type of 
institution and mobile banking service as attributes, we collected 120 combination, 3600 
observations and 300 surveys in first experiment, 81 combination, 3241 observations 
and 120 surveys in second experiment. We choose a discrete choice experiment as the 
tool to collect data from the field. With a D-optimal and efficient experimental design 
for the choice experiments, we ultimately calculate the willingness to pay (WTP) using 
a mixed Logit model. This is described in chapter four. Subsequently, in chapter five, 
the estimating results from conditional Logit and mixed Logit models are provided and 
discussed.  Mixed Logit is highly flexible model that can approximate random utility 
model, which can be used to estimate the effect of the attributes on utility. Then the 
                                                                 ii 
                                                                
 
results from Mixed Logit model are used to calculate WTP, which can measure the 
change in interest rate associated with a unit change in each attribute. In chapter six, we 
finally draw a conclusions concerning the nature, characteristics, and preferences for 
credit demand from previous five chapters. We found that amortization loans with 
longer term are preferred even though they are highly cost. Farmers are willing to pay 
more for guaranteed loan and credit loan. Willingness to pay for institutions vary from 
provinces to provinces, which may be explained by distinct financial environment. The 
conclusions can provide answer to some extent of questions that why the efficiency of 
credit demand is and how to ameliorate the severely mismatch of supply and demand of 
credit in rural china. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The difficulty of financing agriculture in rural China has hindered the development 
of China’s rural economy for a long time. The conflicts between the high risk and low 
profit of farmers has led to a significant imbalance between credit demand and supply. 
Therefore, understanding the characteristics and preference of credit demand for farmer 
households is an important problem to solve. 
Rural financial development has been at the forefront of agricultural and rural 
economic development in China in the modern era since at least 2003. Policies have 
been promulgated, and the regulatory and oversight activities of rural credit have been 
strengthened through the China Banking Regulatory Commission. Since being 
identified as a key objective in the N0. 1 Central Document issued by the government 
in 2006, advancements in credit delivery has made tremendous contributions in 
supporting and promoting the development of the rural economy. The No.1 Central 
Document of 2019, promulgated recently, continues to focus on the rural issues, all of 
which are about rural financial reform.  
With the development of economic reforms, China's rural formal finance has 
improved considerably. A multi-level and comprehensive service system of policy 
banks, commercial banks, cooperative Institutes and new rural financial institutions 
have been formed. However, the progress of rural financial reform has a significant lag 
compared with the development of the rural economy. The system shortage of funds is 
caused by imperfections of the rural financial system may, despite progress, restricting 
rural development in China from its social optimal potential. The main challenges in 
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rural China now are outflowing of rural funds, seriously credit rationing, a contradiction 
between capital supply and demand, as well as market failures in some rural financial 
markets.  
Agricultural credit has played a significant role in helping farmers escape poverty 
and increase wealth. As an important part of China's rural production and management 
activities, farmers can change their resource endowments, expand production and 
increase income through obtaining credit (Weston & Strahan, 1996). With the 
development of emerging agriculture, rural credit demand has further been expanded.  
At the end of 2016, credit files of 172 million farm households had been established, 
and about 92.48 million farm households had obtained loans with a loan balance of 2.7 
trillion yuan.  
Table 1-1 Situation of Economics and Loan 
Year GDP Agriculture 
Add Value 
Ratio of 
Agriculture value 
Loan Agriculture 
Loan 
Ratio of 
Agriculture Loan 
2008 31,603 3,370 10.66% 303,394 6,912 2.28% 
2009 34,032 3,523 10.35% 399,684 9,132 2.28% 
2010 39,976 4,053 10.14% 479,195 11,766 2.46% 
2011 47,310 4,749 10.04% 547,947 14,602 2.66% 
2012 51,947 5,237 10.08% 629,910 17,623 2.80% 
2013 56,885 56,95 10.01% 718,961 20,889 2.91% 
2014 64,397 5,834 9.06% 816,770 23,600 2.89% 
2015 68,551 6,087 8.88% 939,540 26,352 2.80% 
2016 74,359 6,367 8.56% 1,066,040 28,234 2.65% 
2017 82,712 6,547 7.92% 1,201,321 - - 
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
Table 1-1 shows the proportion of the total amount of agricultural loans of financial 
institutions in China, the total amount of loans of financial institutions and the 
proportion of total agricultural added value in GDP over the latest ten years. According 
to the use of funds, agriculture loans can be divided into agriculture, forestry, animal 
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husbandry and fisheries loans and other agriculture-related loans. From the table, we 
can see that both agricultural value and agriculture loan has been increased since 2008. 
By the end of 2016, the amount of agriculture loan goes up to 28,234 million yuan.  
However, the growth rate of agriculture loans has decreased from 32.12% to 7.14% 
from 2008 because of decreasing increase rate of economic development. By 
comparison, we find that the proportion of agricultural loans in China's financial 
institutions' loans is much smaller than that of agriculture to the national economy. The 
financial support is still far from enough.   
He et al. (2018) concludes that as strong as the rural credit demand is, formal credit 
satisfaction is still low and farmers’ credit rationing is still serious. By the end of 
December 2017, the balance of national agricultural loans reached 30.95 trillion yuan. 
However, using auto-regressive and moving average models, Chinese researcher Li 
(2017) forecasted that there will still be a large huge rural financial gap in the following 
year, 8.98 trillion, 11.63 trillion and 13.05 trillion yuan in 2018, 2019 and 2020 
respectively. The circumstances of this rural credit gap suggests wide-spread credit 
rationing (Turvey, 2012). On the supply-side, farmers' effective satisfaction of credit 
demand can smooth consumption and play an irreplaceable role in promoting rural 
economic growth, improving economic structure and maintaining social stability. The 
formal credit market is constrained because of the fragile nature of agricultural 
production and lack of insurance as well as saving (Tang, Guo 2017).  
Though rural credit development is restricted by deficiency of supply, the 
inefficiency of rural credit is mainly caused by a mismatch between supply and demand. 
Understanding the demand-side of rural credit is crucial. For example, increase supply 
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would be effective if aggregate demand was highly elastic and less so if high inelastic. 
At present, rural financial service is difficult to adapt to the development of farmer’s 
demand. Chinese research Ma and Xu (2018) have largely focused on the identification 
of credit constraints: demand-based and supply-based credit constraints. For a sample 
of farms who clearly have credit demand, based on whether there are insufficient supply 
or oversupply, divides the sample into "supply-side credit inhibition" and "demand-side 
credit inhibiting" groups. The empirical results show that the main reason for rural credit 
inhibition in China is demand-based credit constraints caused by risk. 
Rural finance is a core way to solve the deficiency of rural funds and to promote 
the development of rural economy. Increases in farm households’ credit demand is the 
typical performance of the rural finance development process. In china, there is a 
widespread mismatch between credit supply and credit demand. With the continuous 
development of the rural economy and the deepening of the rural financial reform 
process, the characteristics of rural credit demand are going through significant changes. 
As credit demand is of significance in developing rural financial market, digging out 
efficiency demand and satisfying demand is important. Therefore, we need to clarify 
the credit demand of farmers and its influencing factors, which will help to further 
improve the existing rural financial system and arrange rural financial resources more 
efficiently.  
To further understand credit demand, this thesis focuses on the attributes which 
exert influence on farm household decision about credit. Based on the measurement of 
farmers’ credit preference and the difference of willingness to pay, we can evaluate 
farmer’s preference of credit from the perspective of the demander, which will help to 
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improve the efficiency of credit demand and to complete credit policy so that rural 
finance plays a more crucial role in supporting economic development in rural China. 
The overall objective of this study is to investigate the characteristics affecting 
credit demand in china. The specific objectives are to identify the characteristics 
affecting credit demand and to determine the willingness to pay for these attributes 
through development of an in-the-field choice experiment. Based on the modern rural 
financial theory, the study selects interest rate, term of loan, type of loan, type of 
repayment, institution and mobile banking services as attributes, implements two 
discrete choice experiments in Shandong, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Henan and Jiangsu 
provinces in rural China. After analyzing the preference and willingness of borrowers 
for credit product from demand-side, the study will put forward suggestions for 
designing flexible financial services to improve efficient demand. 
The study proceeds with a review of the relevant literature that enlighten this study, 
followed by the underlying methodology applied when processing and analyzing the 
data collected from discrete choice experiment. The experimental, survey designs and 
implementations are described in the subsequent sections. Following this, the results 
from the estimation of the conditional and mixed Logit models are presented and 
discussed, then WTP (willingness to pay) estimates are reported. In the last section, we 
provide the summary and conclusions with regarding to the findings of preference for 
credit products.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter two is the theoretical basis of Rural Credit demand. We examine related 
theories concerning credit demand theory including credit demand behavior of farm 
household and influencing factors of credit demand, credit constraints and rationing 
theory and elasticity of credit demand theory. After concluding the existing literature, 
we put forward a new research problem to complete the research of rural credit. 
2.1 Credit Demand Theory 
There are a lot of studies about motivations of credit demand. Mushinski (1999) 
divided credit demand of farmers into nominal credit demand, effective credit demand 
and potential credit demand and proposed a mechanism to identify and classify three 
kinds of credit demand. A large portion of the capital expenditure of rural households 
in rural China is mainly used for weddings, funerals and children’s education, not 
production and management.  
2.1.1 Credit Demand Behavior of farm household 
Farmers' motivation for lending can be classified into survival motivation, 
productive motivation, consuming motivation, speculative motivation, and inhibitory 
motivation. The middle-aged farmers are more likely to have productive motivation 
(Ghate, 1992). Ghate(1992) found that farmers' production-oriented lending in 
developing countries tends to be applied from a formal financial institution. For non-
production-oriented funding needs, credit applications often turn to informal financial 
institutions (Zeller, 1994) (Doung & Izumida, 2002). In rural China, credit demand is 
mainly from formal and informal institutions. The existing research believe that 
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majority of rural fund come from informal financial institutions such as private lending. 
Rural Credit Cooperative (RCC) is the main rural formal institutions in rural China. 
Using data from over 1500 farm households, Turvey and Kong (2010) confirms a 
relationship between trust and informal lending. With over 67% of farm households 
borrowing from friends and relatives the economic significance between this form of 
informal lending and borrowing from Rural Credit Cooperatives and Micro Finance 
Institutions is important. In general, credit demand can also be divided into production 
demand and household-consumption demand. The former refers to the credit demand 
caused by agriculture enlargement and production, the latter refers to the credit demand 
generated by non-agricultural activities such as house constructions, medicine care, 
children’s education. Some researchers point out that the household-consumption 
demand in rural China has exceeded the production demand.  The main purpose of 
farmers is for daily activities and life.  
2.1.2 Influencing Factors of Credit Demand 
As for the influence factors of credit demand, the framework of research including 
literatures and methods is well established. According to Stigliz and Weiss (1981) , there 
is a strong correlation between the education as well as economic level of Chinese 
farmers and number of borrowing; with the increase in income, the propensity to apply 
credit loan for profitable investment has increased significantly. Using a Tobit 
regression model, Izumida and Pham (2002) did research about farmers’ choice on 
credit source channels and indicated that family production scale and family livestock 
value are the main factors affecting farmer’s choice of formal credit. Jappelli (2002) 
compared farmers in three villages through multi-regression model. The results showed 
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that farmers with lower land value had lower chance of obtaining loans from formal 
financial institutions than those with higher land value. In addition, family 
characteristics and the conditions of loans are another two influencing factors. Mpuga 
(2010) did research on rural credit demand in Uganda by constructing Logit, Probit and 
Tobit models. The factors that affect the credit demand of farmers are as follows: age, 
education level, location, asset and occupation. After researching the credit behavior of 
farmers in India, Charkavarty and Pal (2013) and found that credit can be positively 
correlated with the farmer's agricultural land value. The higher the land value is, the 
easier for farmer to obtain credit loan from financial institutions. Moreover, if the farmer 
has a salary-based income and sufficient borrowing experience, the possibility of 
obtaining loans from financial institutions is great. To avoid bias from endogeneity of 
interest rate and optimize econometrics method, Swain (2007) applied a type 3 Tobit 
model with data from Orissa and India. He figured out that interest rate, net-wealth, area 
of operational holdings, primary activity of the head of the household and output price 
are factors that determine demand for credit. In addition, according to Boucher (2002), 
farmers' credit demand will be reduced because of high transaction costs and high risks. 
As increase of transaction costs and risks, farmers form negatively expectations for 
future investments and voluntarily give up loans. 
In China, based on data collected in 2007-2008 from Heilongjiang Province China, 
Tang and Guo (2017) show that households' decisions on whether to borrow are mainly 
determined by households' production capacity and the transactions costs. Increasing 
the accessibility of formal credits by reducing the transaction costs is an essential to 
enhance formal credit markets. Other studies examined factors such as savings relative 
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to households' production scale, collateral risk, policies and availability of credit 
markets. Han and Luo (2015) conducted a questionnaire survey of farmers in Gansu 
Province and concluded that there are differences in the factors affecting the credit 
demand of farmers in different regions, which may be due to different factors or 
different influencing factors. However, the family labor force has a significant impact 
on farmers' credit demand. For interest rate, it is generally considered that the impact on 
the credit demand of farmers is not obvious. Han Jun concluded that interest rates are 
not the main consideration for household credit. However, farm household income, 
production characteristics and family characteristics are the determining factors of 
farmers' borrowing behavior. 
2.2 Credit Constraints and Rationing 
2.2.1 Credit Constraints 
Rural credit markets in developing and developed countries are very different. 
Developing countries have been severely facing credit constraints. Kritikos and 
Vigenina (2005) report that the reason for exclusion of the poor from financial markets 
contains a risk and cost component. Franklin Simtowe (2008) finds that households with 
more adult male members have a greater likelihood of facing credit constraints, 
wealthier households and household with higher value land are less likely to report 
credit constraints. 
In China, Dong et al. (2012) uses data and switching regression model to explore 
the effect of credit constraints. Empirical estimates of the impacts of credit constraints 
on agricultural productivity are provided for the Heilongjiang province. By removing 
credit constraints, average agricultural productivity was estimated to be increased by 75 
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percent. Ma and Xu (2018) focus on identification of credit constraints: demand-based 
and supply-based credit suppression and the author states that the main reason for rural 
credit inhibition in China is demand-based credit suppression caused by risk. In addition, 
lowering loan interest rates and raising bank risk-taking ability is very effective in 
enhancing the credit support effect of demand-side credit suppression. 
2.2.2 Credit Rationing 
It is believed that credit rationing of financial institutions is one of the main reasons 
of credit constraints. Baltensperger (1978) first proposed the definition of credit 
rationing. Credit rationing is a situation in which the credit demand is still unsatisfied 
even if the borrower is willing to accept all the price in the credit contract. Boucher 
(2002) classifies credit rationing into quantity rationing, risk rationing, and cost 
rationing which negates the early theory that there only exists quantity rationing. 
Boucher and Carter (2008) developed a model that shows that asymmetric information 
can lead to two types of credit rationing: conventional quantity rationing, and risk 
rationing whereby household farm could borrow but only under high-collateral 
contracts with high well-being which sacrifice some security. 
Based on research and studies, reasons for credit rationing are as follows: First, 
interest rate control and quantity restriction of rural credit funded by the government 
and high transaction costs of rural credit are the main reason of credit rationing to farm 
households. Second, since the 1980s, with the rise of the information economics theory, 
it is believed that avoiding adverse selection and moral hazard caused by information 
asymmetry result in credit constraints. Third, demand repression is also one of the 
reasons for the credit constraints of farmers. Storey (2004) found that many farm 
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households voluntarily give up loans for the reason that they lacked the confidence to 
apply for loans successfully or that they are faced higher transaction cost and higher 
refuse rate.  
As for the reason and influence factors of credit rationing, there are many studies. 
Chaudhuri and Cherical (2012) constructed the BPSS model of credit-demand rationing 
and supply-demand rationing. According to He (2005) Credit rationing occurs because 
of the information asymmetry between formal and informal lenders. Because of the risks 
involved, formal lenders are only willing to lend to borrowers who can provide collateral. 
Jia et al. (2010) found that the factors affecting farmers' demand-type rationing are: 
the education level of the head of household, whether they have obtained formal channel 
loans, bank loan interest rates, distance to bank outlets, and dummy variables in Luxi 
area. In practically, Jia indicates that pervasive credit rationing exists in the formal credit 
market in rural China. He figures out that farmer with social entitlement are less likely 
to be credit rationed. Human capital – in particular education – is crucial in determining 
the status of credit rationing in both formal and informal market. Households that rely 
more on agricultural revenue are less likely to be formally credit rationed. Leslie and 
Turvey (2014) investigate factors associated with risk rationed, price rationed and 
quantity rationed farmers through analyzing data from 730 farm households in the 
Shaanxi province of China and from 372 farmers in northeastern Mexico. They found 
that the incidence of risk rationing in farmers to be 6.5, 14 percent for quantity rationed 
and 80 percent for price rationed in China whereas 5 percent of the sample is risk 
rationed, 10 percent quantity rationed and 55 percent price rationed in Mexico. 
Specifically, poor farm household are more likely to be quantity rationed in China and 
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education level is important in determining quantity rationed in Mexico. Risk aversion 
and prudence are significantly correlated with risk rationing in China, while only risk 
aversion is significant in Mexico. In both countries, asset wealthy farmers are less likely 
to be risk rationed; however, income does not appear to have an impact. 
2.3 Elasticity of Credit Demand 
Credit demand elasticity is of high value when we try to solve the mismatch of 
credit demand and supply through improving efficient credit demand. Using survey data, 
Bogan et al. (2015) shows that micro-entrepreneurs have close to unit elastic demand 
for micro credit. At a given interest rate, the percentage change is met by nearly the 
equal percentage change in the demand quantity. Turvey et al. (2012) extracts individual 
household credit demand functions from demand elasticities with 897 farm households 
in Shaanxi and Gansu provinces. According to Turvey et al. (2012), the elasticities were 
highly heterogeneous across household farmers with some having high elasticities and 
others completely inelastic demands for credit. Elasticities were also affected by many 
demographic and economic factors. Credit demand is more inelastic at higher interest 
rates and less inelastic or elastic at lower interest rates. Farms with different ages, 
education levels and revenues have different demand elasticities. After running an 
experiment in China and Mexico, Leslie (2014) points out that credit demand elasticities 
differ among rating typologies. A large portion of risk rationed farmers have inelastic 
demands for credit but a lower interest rates even risk rationed farmers might enter the 
credit market. They conclude that it is important to deal with risk in order to increase 
agricultural investment and alleviate poverty.  
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2.4 Summary 
In summary, above studies has analyzed the credit demand and credit constraints 
from different aspects. Some of scholars are committed to analyze influencing factors 
of credit demand of farm household. Some of them aims to construct measurement 
system of credit constraints and estimate the credit gap. Some researchers manage to 
calculate demand elasticities in order to better solve the credit deficiency. All of these 
provide detailed information and scientific methods of credit demand, which lay 
foundation for further research. However, the majority of existing studies blame the 
imbalance in the rural financial situation on a deficiency of supply, neglecting the 
demand-suppression of credit. We define the credit-demand rationing as people don’t 
apply for credit even though they have a real demand for credit. 
 
Figure 2-1 Credit Rationing Structure 
Research regarding further depth of preference and willingness of credit demand is 
absent. Credit demand of farm household exhibits huge differences at different locations 
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and across different economic levels. In our study, we aim to focus more on demand-
side of credit. In classic economic theory, the optimal amount of loan will be improved 
when there are positive value attributes in a given amount of supply, while optimal 
amount of loan will be decreased when there are negative value attributes.  
 
Figure 2 -2 Supply and Demand of Credit 
As we aim to improve demand and ameliorate the credit-demand rationing, we 
ultimately provide estimates of the willingness to pay (WTP) for specific attributes of 
credit combination, which can give us more information of consumers’ choice. We 
implement our experiments in five provinces with totally different natural resources and 
economic levels, and in doing so we illuminate the relationships between credit demand 
with different economics characteristics. The actual design of the choice experiment is 
provided in chapter 3, and the regression techniques employed are advanced in chapter 
4
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPERIMENT IMPLEMENTATION AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
In this chapter we introduce how we implement two experiments in rural China. 
There are four steps in designing: identifying attributes and levels, creating the 
experiment design, designing survey and estimating the choice model. The purpose of 
this chapter is to explicitly describe the whole process of discrete choice experiment. 
This is followed in Chapter 3 be a fuller explanation of the Mixed Logit regression used 
to analyze the choice data and determine the WTP values. 
3.1 Experiment Design 
Following Hoyos’ and Victorino study, we develop four steps to design the whole 
experience which are in the following figure.  
Figure 3-1 Experiment Design Process 
Experiment 
Design
1.Identifying 
attributes and 
levels
3. Designing 
Survey
4. Implementing 
the choice model
2.Creating the 
experiment design
                                                                 16 
                                                                
 
 
3.1.1 Attributes and levels Identification 
Attributes are product characteristics influencing consumer choice, which means 
products are made of attributes. As the size and complexity of choice experiments grow 
exponentially with increase in the number of attributes, we choose attributes carefully 
and literally (Crouch & Louviere, 2004). After prudently consider, interest rate, term of 
loan, type of loan, type of repayment, type of institution, mobile banking are selected to 
be attributes. 
Interest Rate is the cost or price of credit, which is the most direct and deterministic 
characteristic of credit product for farm household. According to Keynes, consumer’s 
demand of a product decrease with the rise of product cost. In other words, credit 
demand of farm household would decrease as the increase of interest rate. Interest rate 
is the most powerful tool for government and central bank to regulate the supply and 
demand of money. It is also the most significant factor of credit rationing and credit 
constraints in rural district. In China, interest rate is different with different financial 
institution and different term of loan. The lending interest rate is a benchmark interest 
rate from central bank plus floating interest rate from individual bank. Interest rate of 
RCC in 2018 is as following table: 
Table 3-1 Benchmark Interest Rate with Different Term 
Data source: China Statistical Yearbook  
Term 12/26/2010 4/6/2011 7/7/2011 7/6/2012 11/22/2014 5/11/2015 10/24/2015 
Short-
term 
Loan 
0.5 Year 5.35 5.85 6.10 5.60 5.60 5.10 4.35 
1 Year 5.81 6.31 6.56 6.00 5.60 5.10 4.35 
Long-
term 
Loan 
1-3 Year 5.85 6.40 6.65 6.15 5.75 5.25 4.75 
3-5 Year 6.22 6.65 6.90 6.40 6.00 5.50 4.75 
5 Year 6.40 6.80 7.05 6.55 6.15 5.65 4.90 
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As an attribute, for interest rate, we set seven scenarios with interest rate rising and 
falling from the base rate. The levels of interest rate are: 2%, 4%, 6%, 8%, 10%, 12%, 
14%.  
Term of loan is another distinct characteristic of credit product. For lenders/ farmers, 
they always have demand of loan with long maturity term because agricultural 
production is a long-term activity which requires long-term investment and cultivation. 
However, longer-term of credit loan means higher cost. This is a trade-off between term 
of loan and cost of loan. For borrowers/financial institution, longer-term loan means 
high and steady profit whereas it also indicates that lenders take risks or may face 
liquidity crisis. To find the effect of term of loan in farm household credit decision, we 
add term of loan as an attribute. According to RCC, there are five different term of loan: 
Less than six months, six months to one year, one year to three years, three years to five 
years, longer than five years. The longer the term, the higher the interest rate. For 
borrowers, how to decide among loans with different term is a trade-off between actual 
situation and price.  
Type of loan also effect farm household decision. There are three basic type of loan 
in rural China: Collateral Loan, Guaranteed Loan and Credit Loan. Collateral Loan is a 
loan with higher security and less risk because a collateral increases the expected return 
of the lender and creates an incentive for borrowers to avoid intentionally default (Feder, 
Onchan, & Raparla, 1988). Land property is now the most powerful and common 
collateral in rural China now. A Guaranteed Loan is a loan issued on the condition that 
a third party provides the corresponding guarantee for the borrower. The most common 
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guaranteed loan in rural China is group guarantee. Farmers form groups such that while 
they borrow individually, the group as a whole is responsible for each of its members’ 
loans. It is expected that social pressures will minimize defaults. Risk in guaranteed loan 
is higher than collateral loan. A credit loan is a loan issued on the creditworthiness of 
the borrower, and the borrower does not need to provide a guarantee. Credit loan is 
seldom in rural China because it is of highest risk for lenders. Conversely, it is of lowest 
transaction cost for borrowers. These Three types of loan above are with different level 
of risk which is the main reason of different price of loans because loan transaction 
typically involve the risk of borrower default (Feder, Onchan, & Raparla, 1988). 
Collateral loan, guaranteed loan and credit loan are with risk from lowest to highest 
level, therefore the price (interest rate) of the three loans are increasing. For borrowers, 
how to decide among three type of loans is a trade-off between transaction cost and 
price.  
Type of repayment is the fourth attribute we select. Basically, there are always two 
kind of repayment methods for farm household in rural China: pay off at one and 
amortization. Pay off at once means borrowers pays off the principal and interest of the 
loan at one time before or when the loan expires. It is generally applicable to a loan with 
small amount and short term. Amortization is a way that the principal of the loan will 
be repaid in equal amounts with decreasing interest every month during the loan period. 
It is used more when one applies large amount of loan. Amortization requires higher 
interest rate for the reason that it usually used in the loan with larger amount and longer 
term.  
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Institution is the fifth attribute we use. Rural financial Institutions exert decisive 
role in rural economic development. Since 1978, after reforms of rural finance, a 
complicated rural formal financial system with rural cooperating, commercial and 
policy financial institution have been formed. The structure of rural financial institutions 
is illustrated in Figure 3-2.  
 
Figure 3-2 Structure of Rural Financial System 
 
China's rural credit market is mainly served by Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs), 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and Postal Savings Bank of China (PSBC). The 
original intention of establishment of the ABC is to better service “SanNong”. During 
the commercialization reform, the institution of ABC in the countries and townships 
were narrowed and gradually exited the rural financial market. In 2010, ABC, as a leader 
of “Three Rural Finance Department” Reform, expanded the business line in county and 
town. By the end of 2015, 19 experiment cases (in 19 different districts) of reform had 
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the loan balance of 2.26 trillion yuan. It can be seen that ABC plays more and more 
crucial role in rural finance. PSBC was formally established in March 2007. It is a 
leading large-scale retailing commercial bank, which aims to serve small and medium-
sized enterprises and “three-rural” issues, microfinance and rural businesses. The rural 
credit cooperative financial system (including rural commercial banks, rural cooperative 
banks and rural credit cooperatives) is the main server of formal finance in rural China. 
RCCs serve as one of government regulated source of rural credit providing loans to 
farms in China (Turvey, Xu, & Kong, 2014). To enhance the efficiency and risk 
management of RCCs, RCCs have gradually transformed into Rural Commercial Banks 
(RCBs). Here RCCs means both RCCS and RCBs. By the end of 2017, the balance of 
deposits and loans of the RCC were 27.2 trillion yuan and 15 trillion yuan respectively, 
accounting for 16.1% and 11.9% of the balance of deposits and loans of all financial 
institutions in the same period. The balance of loans to farmers and households were 9 
trillion yuan and 4.4 trillion yuan, an increase of 9.5% and 11.6% respectively from the 
end of the previous year. Appling non-balanced provincial panel data of China from 
1997 to 2014, Nan finds that credit from RCCs relax rural credit constraints and foster 
agricultural growth (Nan, Gao, & Zhou, 2019). The following table shows the number 
of institutions of RCC system. From the above table, it can be seen that the under the 
huge development of RCC system proportion of commercial finance continues to rise, 
and the properties of cooperative finance is weakening.  
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Table 3-2 Situation of RCC System 
 2012 2014 2017 
RCC 1927 1596 907 
Rural Commercial Bank 337 665 1262 
Rural Cooperative Bank 147 89 33 
Village Bank 800 1153 - 
Data Source: China Financial Yearbook 
 
Mobile Banking Service is the last attribute. With the popularization of Internet and 
smartphone, the convenience of terminal applications has become an important factor 
for consumers to make choices. To adapt the tendency, almost every finance or non-
finance institution explore their own application. In rural China, smartphone coverage 
is pretty high and mobile banking services have developed rapidly. Mobile Banking not 
only enables consumer to handle financial service anytime and anywhere, but also 
greatly enriches the meaning of traditional banking services, enabling banks to provide 
efficient and secure service. In addition, for household famers, reducing transaction cost 
and transportation cost the most appealing attraction. Given the perceived situation, we 
seek to determine whether mobile banking service encourage farmers to demand more 
loans. 
Therefore, we identify six attributes with seven levels, five levels, three levels, two 
levels, three levels and two levels respectively. The following table shows the detail and 
whole picture of attributes and levels.  
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Table 3-3 Attributes and levels of discrete choice experiment 
Attributes Level 
Interest Rate 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 
Term of Loan 
Less than six 
months 
Six months 
to one year 
One year to 
three years 
Three years to 
five years 
Longer than 
five years 
Type of loan Collateral Loan Guaranteed Loan Credit Loan 
Type of repayment Pay off at one Amortization 
Type of Institution 
Rural Credit 
Cooperatives 
Agricultural Bank of 
China 
Postal Savings Bank of 
China 
Mobile Banking Yes No 
 
3.1.2 Create the experiment design 
We ran two discrete choice experiments for credit demand research in rural China. 
The first experiment was implemented in May 2018 in three provinces within assistance 
of Sichuan Agricultural University, Northwest Agricultural and Forestry University, 
Shandong University of Finance and Economics and Central University of Finance and 
Economics. After collecting and primarily processing data, we design a second 
experiment in October 2018 in two provinces with help of from Nanjing Agricultural 
University, ZheJiang University and Shandong University of Finance and Economics. 
In the discrete choice experiment, we use D-optimal design in the first experiment 
and Bayesian D-optimal design in the second experiment. The technical details of D-
optimal design are provided in detail in Chapter 4. 
In the first Discrete Choice Experiment on credit in Shandong, Sichuan and Shaanxi 
provinces in China, there are six attributes with five, seven, three, two, three and two 
levels separately. Therefore, there should be 1260 combination totally. We decide to 
apply D-optimal method to design the experiment instead of factorial method which 
requires too many runs for the amount of resources and time. D-optimal design matrices 
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are usually not orthogonal. D-optimal designs are straight optimizations based on a 
chosen optimality criterion and the model that will be fit.  
In order to fit an optimally criterion, we define the number of the experiments we 
want to have in the design. The sole rule to defining the number is that it should be 
larger than the number of coefficients. After taking the resources and practical situation 
into consideration, we decided to run 120 combination and 3600 observations on credit 
experiments. In JMP, we design the first experiment with six attributes, ten versions of 
survey, six choice sets per survey, two profiles per choice. One of the cards is as follows: 
 
Figure 3-3 Card of first experiment 
In the second experiment, we run 81 combination and 3241 observations on credit 
experiments. In JMP, we design the first experiment with three versions of survey, nine 
choice sets per survey, three profiles per choice. Two of the cards are as follows: 
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Figure 3-4 Card of second experiment 
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Figure 3-5 Another Card of second experiment 
3.1.3 Survey Design 
To support the discrete choice experiment and complete the whole story of rural 
credit, we also create survey design. The whole questionnaire consists of four sections: 
farm characteristics, farm risk attitude and credit demand. 
There are 20 questions in farm characteristics section concerning basic information 
including family characteristics, farm activities and respondents’ economical level. 
From the section, economic level of sample can be indicated, which could provide to 
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some extent an explanation for the result of discrete choice experiment and compare the 
sample from different provinces. In a risk attitude section, the questions are divided into 
two parts: source of risk and risk perception and precautionary savings. Risk perception 
and risk undertaking ability of farmer household are measured through this section. 
Basically, credit activities have close relationship with risk attitudes of farmer. The third 
part are some specific questions about credit demand. In this part, we collect data of 
respondents’ credit history, asset information and willing to participate in credit.  
3.1.4 Implement of Discrete Choice Experiment 
As explained above, we did two experiments totally. In our first experiment, we 
choose three different provinces in rural China. There are local universities and research 
teams in these three provinces. In each province, there are one professor with around 
twenty students. After training students, they were familiar with underlying logic of 
surveys and cards. Then we spent two-three days in doing field experiment in each 
province. Except the reason that we could get local assistance of universities and 
professors, we choose these three provinces for some other reasons. The following table 
is the basic information of three provinces.  
Table 3-4 Situation of experiment areas 
Data Source: Public Data 
From the above the table, we select three provinces with totally distinct location 
and economical properties. Shandong is the developed province compared with the 
 
Area 
Population 
(million) Location 
GDP 
(billion) 
Agricultural 
Industry 
Agricultural 
Loan-
balance(trillion) 
Percentage 
/total loan 
Shandong 157,100.0 100.1 Eastern 7,267.8 487.7 2,469.0 8.74% 
Sichuan 48,600.0 83.4 Southwest 3,698.0 428.3 1,520.0 5.38% 
Shaanxi 20,560.0 38.6 Northwest 2,190.0 174.0 586.0 2.07% 
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other two, with a large population and GDP. The absolute agricultural added value there 
has ranked first for many years.  
The grain output of Shandong is relatively high. Wheat, corn and sweet potatoes 
are the three main food crops in Shandong. The agricultural loan balance in 2016 is 
2,469 billion, accounting for 8.74% of the total loan balance in China, which implies a 
mature agricultural economics development. We select Shandong as the first location 
for the reason that it is a typical eastern agricultural province. We visited 2 different 
towns with 6 villages in Shandong. Sichuan is located in the southwest of China, the 
most distinguishing district of southern and western china. Agriculture there is well-
formed combining modern and tradition agricultural cultivation. Rice, wheat and corn 
planting have obvious advantages in Sichuan because of the suitable natural condition. 
The agricultural loan balance of Sichuan in 2016 is 1520 trillion, taking up 5.38% of the 
total loan balance. As a typical agricultural province in the southwest, Sichuan is 
selected in this study. Experiment was run in 6 town and 15 villages in Chengdu, capital 
city of Chengdu. Shaanxi, northwest part of China, has the longest history. It has the 
lowest agricultural added value and the ratio of agriculture loan balance among the three 
provinces. On behalf of the traditional agricultural pattern and thinking pattern, Shaanxi 
is selected to run experiment. We visited 5 towns with 11 villages in Shaanxi. Through 
interviewing, we finally visited 100 farm household and collected 1200 combinations 
in each province.  
To support the first experiment and improve the choice experiment based on the 
data collected from the first trial, we ran a second experiment in October 2018. In the 
second experiment, we chose two provinces different from the first trial. Jiangsu and 
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Henan were selected to run the experiment. Jiangsu is located in east of china with 
population of 80.29 million. At the end of 2017, GDP of Jiangsu amounted to 8,059.1 
billion, continue to be the first GDP province in China. Jiangsu was selected to do the 
experiment because it is a leading province in land transfer and land property reform. 
At the central of China, Henan is a traditional agricultural and populous province. At 
the end of 2018, GDP of Henan was 4806 billion yuan and agricultural added value was 
429 billion yuan.  Henan is one of the most important agricultural planting area in China.  
The output of grain, wheat, sesame production ranks first in many years. It is necessary 
to satisfy the credit demand of farm household in Henan to expand agricultural 
production and explore their potential in agricultural industry. The experiment was done 
in 21 villages and 10 villages in Jiangsu and Henan respectively. In each province, we 
interviewed 60 farm household and collected 1620 combinations.  
3.2 Data Description 
3.2.1 Basic Information 
In the two discrete choice experiments, we ran experiments in rural China and 
visited 100 farm households in three provinces and 60 farms in two provinces. The 
following table provides the basic information including family characteristics and 
income-level description of the respondents.  
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Table 3-5 Data Description of First Experiment 
Variable Mean Min Max 
Province SD SC SX JS HN SD SC SX JS HN SD SC SX JS HN 
Age 53.5 55.1 60.0 53.7 50.6 22.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 28.0 76.0 83.0 82.0 83.0 72.0 
Total number of household 4.0 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.8 
1.0 
 
  
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 10.0 14.0 10.0 7.0 8.0 
Number of farmers 1.8 1.6 1.7 - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 4.0 6.0 4.0 - - 
Number of workers 1.1 1.5 1.6 - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 4.0 12.0 8.0 - - 
Years engaged in Agr 30.3 29.5 37.7 - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 60.0 70.0 60.0 - - 
Area of Contracting Land 8.3 7.6 5.0 9.7 6.7 2.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 48.0 230.0 12.0 30.0 50.0 
Transferred Land for Agr 17.7 29.76 0.1 97.3 0.5 -10.5 -8.0 -8.0 -16.0 -6.0 400.0 490.0 15.0 760.0 10.0 
Agricultural Income 41.3 141.1 7.0 302.9 10.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 500.0 4100.0 302.8 3,68.0 86.0 
Non-Agricultural Income 46.1 65.7 39.4 50.6 34.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 153.0 847.0 150.0 175.0 150.0 
Total Revenue 87.5 206.8 46.3 353.5 45.2 2.6 0.0 2.0 170.0 30.0 500.0 3500.0 303.2 3,763.0 153.0 
Production Expenditure 36.6 84.0 4.8 187.1 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 1500.0 1650.0 272.2 1,200.0 20.0 
Consuming Expenditure 21.3 25.0 22.6 42.7 14.8 1.2 0.0 1.3 3.0 0.2 60.0 300.0 70.0 150.0 60.0 
Other Expenditure  4.9 9.4 4.4 13.8 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 40.0 100.0 108.8 60.0 400.0 
Income Surplus 24.6 88.5 14.6 109.7 5.9 -1200.0 -300.0 -33.3 -50.0 -389.0 219.0 18600.0 108.9 3393.0 430.0 
Agricultural Income, Non-Agricultural Income, Total Revenue, Production Expenditure, Consuming Expenditure, Other Expenditure, Income Surplus are in thousands  
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Table 3-5 implies that age, total number of households, number of farmers, number 
of works, years engaged in agriculture of farm household in five provinces are similar 
with slight difference. The average age of respondents in five provinces are: 53.5, 55.1, 
60.0, 53.7, 50.6. The average number of people in household in five provinces are: 4.0, 
4.4, 4.4, 4.6, 4.8. The average area of contracting land in five provinces are: 8.3, 7.6, 
5.0, 9.7, 6.7. However, the size of land transfer, family income and expenditure are 
different to a large extent. The area (mu) of transferred land for agriculture in five 
provinces are: 17.7, 29.76, 0.1, 97.3, 0.5, which indicates that Shaanxi has smallest area 
of transferring land and area of transferring land are largest in Jiangsu. Among five 
provinces, farmers in Jiangsu have much higher income including agricultural and non-
agricultural as well as family expenditure, while Henan’s farmers are relatively poor.  
3.2.2 Credit information 
In the first experiment, 56 respondents had credit demand while 244 respondents 
had no demand on loan. There were 119 farmers with credit history while 181 didn’t 
have. Specifically, there have slight difference among three provinces. As below table 
4-6, credit demand in Shaanxi is a little bit higher than that in Shandong and Sichuan. 
However, the proportion of farmers with credit history in three provinces are of huge 
difference. Farmers in Shaanxi with credit history is four times more than that in 
Shandong and two times more than that in Sichuan.  
As for the familiarity with credit, most farm households know credit more or less. 
In Shandong and Sichuan, most farmers know a little about the credit policy and basic 
credit information. During the survey, we encourage interviewees to image what are 
their possible purpose to apply credit if they could get loans without limitation. From 
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the data in the following table, agricultural production, medical expenses are the main 
uses to apply credit. Half of farm household in Shandong and Sichuan are willing to get 
a loan from financial institutions, the other half would like to borrow from informal 
institutions including friends and relatives. In Shaanxi, however, two thirds of the 
respondents prefer to apply credit from formal financial institution.
Table 3-6 Credit Data Description 
   Shandong Sichuan Shaanxi 
Credit Demand 
Have credit demand 18 17 21 
No credit demand 82 17 79 
Credit History 
Have credit history 17 36 66 
No credit history 83 64 34 
Knowledge of Credit 
Never heard about 6 4 1 
Know a little 54 60 33 
Know a lot 22 15 28 
Be familiar with 18 21 38 
Credit Purpose (Multiple 
Choice) 
Agricultural production 27 40 26 
House construction/renovation 16 32 20 
Purchase of car/motorcycle/bicycle 12 6 4 
Household consumption 5 6 7 
Medical expenses 26 27 42 
Education expenses 3 10 6 
Preferred Credit Source 
Informal institution 46 58 33 
Formal financial institution 54 42 67 
Other 0 0 0 
 
3.2.3 Education level and credit demand 
The education level of farmers can generally be divided into none education 
experience, primary, junior high school, high school, college and graduate. The 
education level of farm household can reflect the potential capacity of production or 
making life to some extent. Table 3-7 implies that farm households in Shaanxi have 
higher education level because of the large portion of high and college degree. 
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Meanwhile Sichuan’s respondents have lower education level. For the whole three 
provinces, majority of farmers have education level lower than college level.  
Table 3-7 Education Level Distribution of sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To understand how education level affect credit demand behavior, we classify 
credit demand, credit history, knowledge of credit, credit purpose, preferred credit 
source into six categories according to education level as table 3-8. 
 None Primary Junior High High College Graduate 
Shandong 1 22 60 14 2 1 
Sichuan 8 34 33 19 6 0 
Shaanxi 1 22 63 12 2 0 
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Table 3-8 Education level and Credit Behavior in Shandong
Province  Credit  None Primary Junior High High College Graduate 
Shan 
dong 
Credit Demand 
Have credit demand 5.56% 11.11% 61.11% 11.11% 5.56% 5.56% 
No credit demand 0.00% 24.39% 59.76% 14.63% 1.22% 0.00% 
Credit History 
Have credit history 5.88% 0.00% 52.94% 23.53% 11.76% 5.88% 
No credit history 0.00% 25.30% 60.24% 13.25% 1.20% 0.00% 
Knowledge of Credit 
Never heard about 16.67% 33.33% 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Know a little 0.00% 29.63% 59.26% 11.11% 0.00% 0.00% 
Know a lot 0.00% 13.64% 68.18% 18.18% 0.00% 0.00% 
Be familiar with 0.00% 5.56% 55.56% 22.22% 11.11% 5.56% 
Credit Purpose     
(Multiple Choice) 
Agricultural production 7.41% 3.70% 70.37% 14.81% 3.70% 0.00% 
House construction/renovation 0.00% 25.00% 43.75% 18.75% 6.25% 6.25% 
Purchase of car/motorcycle/bicycle 0.00% 8.33% 58.33% 16.67% 8.33% 8.33% 
Household consumption 0.00% 20.00% 60.00% 0.00% 20.00% 0.00% 
Medical expenses                                          3.85% 26.92% 53.85% 15.38% 0.00% 0.00% 
Education expenses     0.00% 0.00% 33.33% 66.67% 0.00% 0.00% 
Preferred Credit Source 
Friends and Relatives 2.17% 34.78% 52.17% 8.70% 2.17% 0.00% 
Formal financial institution 0.00% 11.11% 66.67% 18.52% 1.85% 1.85% 
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Table 3-9 Education level and Credit Behavior in Sichuan 
 Province Credit  None Primary Junior High High College Graduate 
Sichuan 
Credit Demand 
Have credit demand 15.79% 10.53% 31.58% 26.32% 15.79% 0.00% 
No credit demand 6.17% 39.51% 33.33% 17.28% 3.70% 0.00% 
Credit History 
Have credit history 11.11% 22.22% 41.67% 16.67% 8.33% 0.00% 
No credit history 6.25% 40.63% 28.13% 20.31% 4.69% 0.00% 
Knowledge of Credit 
Never heard about 25.00% 25.00% 25.00% 25.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Know a little 8.33% 45.00% 30.00% 13.33% 3.33% 0.00% 
Know a lot 6.67% 20.00% 40.00% 26.67% 6.67% 0.00% 
Be familiar with 4.76% 14.29% 38.10% 28.57% 14.29% 0.00% 
Credit Purpose     
(Multiple Choice) 
Agricultural production 2.50% 20.00% 37.50% 27.50% 12.50% 0.00% 
House construction/renovation 12.50% 40.63% 31.25% 3.13% 12.50% 0.00% 
Purchase of car/motorcycle/bicycle 0.00% 60.00% 40.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Household consumption 16.67% 50.00% 33.34% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Medical expenses                                          3.70% 37.04% 37.04% 18.52% 3.70% 0.00% 
Education expenses     20.00% 20.00% 30.00% 30.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Preferred Credit Source 
Friends and Relatives 12.07% 41.38% 29.31% 8.62% 8.62% 0.00% 
Formal financial institution 2.38% 23.81% 40.48% 30.95% 2.38% 0.00% 
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Table 3-10 Education level and Credit Behavior in Shaanxi
 Province Credit   None Primary Junior High High College Graduate 
Shaanxi 
Credit Demand 
Have credit demand 0.00% 14.29% 76.19% 9.52% 0.00% 0.00% 
No credit demand 1.27% 24.05% 59.49% 12.66% 2.53% 0.00% 
Credit History 
Have credit history 1.52% 15.15% 69.70% 12.12% 1.52% 0.00% 
No credit history 0.00% 35.29% 50.00% 11.76% 2.94% 0.00% 
Knowledge of Credit 
Never heard about 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Know a little 3.03% 33.33% 54.55% 9.09% 0.00% 0.00% 
Know a lot 0.00% 17.86% 64.29% 14.29% 3.57% 0.00% 
Be familiar with 0.00% 15.79% 68.42% 13.16% 2.63% 0.00% 
Credit Purpose     
(Multiple Choice) 
Agricultural production 0.00% 19.23% 73.08% 7.69% 0.00% 0.00% 
House construction/renovation 5.00% 15.00% 50.00% 30.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Purchase of car/motorcycle/bicycle 0.00% 25.00% 75.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Household consumption 0.00% 14.29% 57.14% 28.57% 0.00% 0.00% 
Medical expenses                                          2.38% 23.81% 57.14% 16.67% 0.00% 0.00% 
Education expenses     0.00% 16.67% 66.67% 16.67% 0.00% 0.00% 
Preferred Credit Source 
Friends and Relatives 3.03% 24.24% 54.55% 15.15% 3.03% 0.00% 
Formal financial institution 0.00% 20.90% 67.16% 10.45% 1.49% 0.00% 
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In Shandong, Sichuan and Shaanxi, the percentage of farmers with junior high level 
are high in every aspect because farmers graduated from junior high takes up majority. 
Education level has little influence on credit demand in Shandong and Sichuan while it 
impacts farmers’ credit demand and history in Shaanxi. The higher education level the 
farmers have, the higher awareness of credit. In terms of the credit purpose, farmer with 
relatively lower education level use the credit loan in house construction/renovation, 
household consumption whereas farmers with higher education level tend to apply 
credit on agricultural production and education in previous two provinces. In Shaanxi, 
however, it does not play a distinct role for farmers in purpose of loan. As for credit 
source, farmers which is well-educated are willing to get loan from formal financial 
institution.  
3.2.4 Agriculture Insurance and credit demand 
Agricultural insurance is policy insurance which is subsided by government in rural 
China. Table 3-11 shows that agriculture insurance coverage is higher in Shandong and 
lower in Shaanxi. Farmers with agriculture insurance generally have higher credit 
demand. However, the difference between with insurance and without insurance is 
slight.   
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Table 3-11 Credit Demand and Agriculture Insurance 
 
 
 
3.3 Summary 
Chapter three describes experiments implementation including four steps. With the 
assistance of Chinese local universities, professors and students, we successfully ran 
two experiments in five provinces. We collect 120 combination, 3600 observations and 
300 surveys in first experiment, 81 combination, 3241 observations and 120 surveys in 
second experiment. Simple statistical description is shown in chapter four which 
provides foundation of econometric analysis for the next chapter. 
Province Credit Demand Has Agriculture Insurance No Agricultural Insurance 
Shandong 
Has Credit Demand 94.44% 5.56% 
No Credit Demand 96.34% 3.66% 
Sichuan 
Has Credit Demand 64.71% 35.29% 
No Credit Demand 61.45% 38.55% 
Shaanxi 
Has Credit Demand 85.71% 14.29% 
No Credit Demand 78.48% 21.52% 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
In the previous chapter I presented the steps and reasoning behind the discrete 
choice experiment as implemented in-the-field in China. In this chapter I outline the 
econometric techniques used to analyze this data. Underlying the choice experiment is 
the notion of ‘random utility’. The random utility model provides several mechanisms 
to investigate experimental designs, including conditional and mixed Logit models. This 
chapter reviews random utility theory, and uses this to justify the use of conditional and 
or mixed Logit models as the core econometric approach to investigating choice 
experiments. The regression results and measures of willingness to pay will be presented 
in the next chapter.  
4.1 Random Utility Theory 
In this study, a mixed random parameter multinomial Logit (MMNL) model is 
adopted to modeling for credit decision of farm households.  
A product (a credit decision in this study) is a bundle of attributes, and utilities are 
derived from the bundle of attributes rather than the product as a whole. Random utility 
theory can be used as a theoretical framework to analyze consumer choice (McFadden 
& Zarembka, 1974)In an n-choice situation (n = 1, 2, or 3), consumer i’s utility (𝑈𝑛𝑖) 
can be modeled as a linear function of product attributes (𝑋𝑛𝑗): 
                                              𝑈𝑛𝑗 = 𝑉𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗 = 𝑋𝑛𝑗𝛽 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗                                      4-1 
This is a Logit Model, which is also called “Random Utility Model”, where 𝛽 is a 
vector of unknown part-worth utilities associated with attribute 𝑋𝑛𝑗. The deterministic 
part, 𝑉𝑛𝑗  is parameterized by 𝛽, which allows us to estimate the effect of the variable, 
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𝑋𝑛𝑗 on utility. The random error term 𝜀𝑛𝑗 reflects the fact that decision makers are going 
to prefer different alternatives given that they prefer the attributes of each alternative 
differently. 
The probability that decision maker 𝑛 selects alternatives 𝑖 is: 
𝑝𝑛𝑖 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑈𝑛𝑖 > 𝑈𝑛𝑗 , ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑖) 
= 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑉𝑛𝑖 + 𝜀𝑛𝑖 > 𝑉𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗 , ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑖) 
= 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜀𝑛𝑗 − 𝜀𝑛𝑖 < 𝑉𝑛𝑖 − 𝑉𝑛𝑗 , ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑖) 
                                           = ∫ 𝐼(𝜀𝑛𝑗 − 𝜀𝑛𝑖 < 𝑉𝑛𝑖 − 𝑉𝑛𝑗 , ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑖)𝑓(𝜀𝑛)𝑑𝜀𝑛                    4-2 
if 𝜀𝑛𝑗~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝐸𝑉, the choice probability 𝑝𝑛𝑖 is                           
                                                      𝑝𝑛𝑖 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝑉𝑛𝑖)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝑉𝑛𝑗)
𝐽
𝑗=1
                                                 4-3 
The above Logit is conditional Logit, which means attribute 𝑥𝑛𝑗 it is decided by 
both of individuals and alternatives and random utility caused by 𝑥𝑛𝑗 does not depend 
on alternatives 𝑗. To be specific, the choice probability can be written as p(𝑦𝑗 = 𝑗|𝑥𝑛𝑗) 
because it is a conditional probability. The assumption of the conditional Logit model 
implies that the unobserved factors are uncorrelated over alternatives, as well as having 
the same variance for all alternatives.  
McFadden and Train (2002) developed the mixed Logit model, they show that a 
mixed Logit can approximate any Logit model. The fundamental idea behind the mixed 
Logit model is the utility from any one choice is no longer independent of any other 
choice, but rather correlated through the introduction. Generally, a mixed Logit model 
contains two sections: a Logit speciation of an individual’s probability of choosing a 
given alternative; a specification of the distribution of the utility (Train, 2016). 
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The mixed Logit is: 
                                              𝑈𝑛𝑗 = 𝑉𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗 = 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑗 + 𝜀𝑛𝑗                                    4-4 
The only difference between the conditional Logit model and mixed Logit model 
is that the response parameter varies over decision makers n. In a Mixed Logit model, 
elements in vector β are defined as random variables following density 
function:𝛽𝑛~𝑓(𝛽0, 𝐺) where 𝛽0 is are the means of 𝛽𝑛, and G is the variance matrix. In 
this study, we assume that 𝛽𝑛 are distributed normally: 𝛽𝑛~𝑁(𝛽, 𝜎𝛽). 
                                                𝑝𝑛𝑖 = ∫
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑖)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑗)
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝑓(𝛽)𝑑𝛽                                    4-5 
McFadden and Train have shown that a mixed Logit model can, under benign 
conditions, approximate any choice model to any degree of accuracy (McFadden & 
Train, 2000). Thus, we choose mixed Logit in this study. The utility function in this 
study is: 
                                                𝑈𝑛𝑖 = 𝑉𝑛𝑖 + 𝜀𝑛𝑖 = 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑖 + 𝜀𝑛𝑖                                    4-6 
 
where  
n is the farm households 
i is decision of credit product 
x consists of the following variables: Interest Rate, Term of Loan, Credit Loan, 
Guaranteed Loan, Amortization, RCC, PSBC, Mobile Banking (We will explain this in 
chapter four). 
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4.2 Discrete Choice Experiment 
According to Hanemann (1984), consumer decisions can be separated into discrete 
and continuous choice. To better depict discrete choice of farm household when they 
make a decision for credit product, this study applies Discrete Choice Experiment. 
Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) was first put forward by Louviere and Hensher 
(1982) and then was gradually completed and applied in psychology, economics with 
random utility theory, and environmental valuation. 
A discrete choice experiment (DCE) allows us to collect choice data. There are 
several choice situations in the experiment. A collection of attributes is a production 
alternative (profile). Respondents in experiments choose one of the alternatives. DCE 
involve people comparing prospective products and picking up their preferred one. Each 
choice alternative is defined by a set of attributes, each attribute takes at least one levels. 
Respondents' choices (decisions) imply implicit trade-offs between the levels of the 
attributes in the different alternatives included in a choice set. The purpose of DCE is to 
define a product that people want to buy. When cost or price is included in attributes, 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) can be calculated.  
In a factorial design, all possible combinations of the levels of the factors are 
investigated in each replication. However, it is also unrealistic. Efficiency is a measure 
of the level of precision in which effects are estimated. Factorial designs are most 
efficient for this type of experiment. According to Street et al. (2005) Various efficiency 
criteria have been proposed, such as A-error or D-error. The D-error has become the 
most widely used measure of efficiency because of its insensitivity to the magnitude of 
the scale of the parameters. Although the inclusion of a status quo option may reduce 
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efficiency, as mentioned before, it should be included on the grounds of better 
congruency with consumer theory and real choices. Consequently, there may be a trade-
off between optimality and plausibility. It is clear that from a statistical perspective, 
optimal design is desirable, but from an empirical perspective some other issues need to 
be taken into account, such as task complexity, heuristics or the inclusion of a base 
scenario or status quo option (Lancsar, & Louviere 2008). 
As discussed in Chapter 3, We ran two discrete choice experiments for credit 
demand research in rural China. The first experiment was implemented in May 2018 in 
three. After collecting and primarily processing data, we design a second experiment in 
October 2018 in two provinces. In the two discrete choice experiments, to select the best 
combination we use a criterion. We use D-optimal design in the first experiment and 
Bayesian D-optimal design in the second experiment.  
We decide to apply D-optimal method to design the experiment instead of factorial 
method which requires many runs for the amount of resources and time. D-optimal 
design matrices are usually not orthogonal. D-optimal designs are straight optimizations 
based on a chosen optimality criterion and the model that will be fit.  
The optimality criterion used in D-optimal designs is maximizing the determinant 
of |ATA|, the determinant of the information matrix ATA. The rows of A =
[𝑎1, 𝑎2, … 𝑎𝑞]
𝑇
 are chosen from M possible tests vectors 𝑢𝑖 ∈ 𝑅
𝑃 , 𝑖 = 1, … 𝑀 which are 
known in advance. Then,𝑎𝑖 ∈ {𝑢1, … 𝑢𝑀}, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑞. Matix A is made up of these test 
vectors 𝑢𝑖, the matrix A
TA can be written as: 
                                                          𝐴 = 𝑞 ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑢𝑖𝑢𝑖
𝑇𝑀
𝑖=1                                             4-7 
where 𝜆𝑖 is the fraction of rows in A that are equal to the vector 𝑢𝑖.  
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The D-optimal experiment design can be written as a minimum determined problem 
(Triefenbach, 2008) 
minimize 𝜆   𝑙𝑜𝑔  𝑑𝑒𝑡 (∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑢𝑖𝑢𝑖
𝑇𝑀
𝑖=1 )
−1
 
                                subject to 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0, ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1 = 1   𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚                               4-8 
 
D-optimal design is model-dependent which means if we change model, another 
matrix and information matrix will be calculated. In this case, we choose linear mode, 
which means a combination of a coefficient 𝛽𝑖 and a factor 𝑥𝑖.  
Based on information of first experiment, we apply Bayesian D-optimal design in 
second experiment. Sándor and Wedel introduced Bayesian D-optimal design models 
that are ideally suited to deal with model uncertainty (Sndro & Wedel, 2001). As this 
method incorporate all prior information which would lower the standard errors and 
could reduce sample size, Bayesian D-optimal design takes advantage over D-optimal 
design (Hoyos, 2010).  Bayesian D-optimal design usually requires a distribution p(β) 
for the unknown parameter β , the distribution of response, given the unknown 
parametersβ, p p(y|β), a utility function of the form U(choice, β, ξ, y). For design ξ, the 
expected utility of the choice is  
                               𝑈(𝜉) = ∫ 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑦
∫ 𝑈(𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒, 𝛽, 𝜉, 𝑦)
𝛽
 𝑝(𝛽|𝜉)𝑑𝛽𝑑𝑦                     4-9 
The Bayesian D-optimal design ξ𝑥 maximize the expected utility: ξ𝑥 = max 𝑈(ξ) 
(Jones & Lin, 2008). 
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4.3 Summary 
In this chapter I reviewed the random utility model and related conditional and 
mixed Logit models. The proposed econometric technique is used to investigate the 
results from the choice experiment as described in Chapter 3. Combined, these 
methodologies are the core part of designing experiment and analyzing data. As seen in 
figure 4-1, we apply D-optimal design as used in the first experiment and Bayesian D-
optimal design in second experiment. After comparing conditional Logit and mixed 
Logit model, we finally choose mixed Logit to explain the data. In the next step, we 
mainly introduce how to do the experiment using D-optimal design.  
 
 
Figure 4-1 Research Map 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
After field experiments implementation and simple data description, chapter five 
focus on analyzing data from discrete choice experiment. As discussed in chapter three, 
we ran mixed Logit model and conditional Logit model for two experiments and five 
provinces separately. Chapter five aims to estimate utility function parameters and 
calculate willingness to pay of farmers for credit.    
5.1 Logit Results  
After design and implement of discrete choice experiment, we interviewed 300 
farm households in the first experiment and 120 farm households in the second 
experiment and finally collected 3600 combinations and 3240 combinations (as 
explained in chapter three and chapter four). Following Table 5-1 presents conditional 
Logit and mixed Logit results from first and second experiments. 
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Table 5-1 Utility Function Parameter Estimate of First and Second Experiment 
 
 Mixed Logit Conditional Logit 
 First Experiment Second Experiment First Experiment Second Experiment 
VARIABLES Mean SD Mean SD   
InterestRate -0.3739***  -0.5267***  -0.2925*** -0.4980*** 
 0.0301  0.0282  0.02 0.0252 
TermofLoan 0.0936** 0.3877*** 0.2598*** 0.1672*** 0.0599** 0.2458*** 
 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.0248 0.0327 
GuaranteedLoan 0.0762 -0.6348*** 0.1616 0.1276 0.0684 0.1856* 
 0.1141 0.1495 0.1046 0.1587 0.0887 0.0969 
CreditLoan 0.5900*** 0.1531 0.4776*** 0.3200*** 0.4994*** 0.4772*** 
 0.1165 0.3162 0.1041 0.1221 0.0943 0.0916 
Amortization 0.5945*** -0.8703*** 0.3842*** 0.5244*** 0.4534*** 0.3524*** 
 0.1121 0.1905 0.1048 0.1136 0.0746 0.0734 
RCC 0.2952*** -0.3752 -0.0833 -0.1878 0.1984*** -0.0533 
 0.0936 0.2522 0.1078 0.1681 0.0719 0.0937 
PSBC 0.2759** -0.3205 -0.1025 0.0036 0.2081** -0.081 
 0.1141 0.302 0.0976 0.329 0.0899 0.0898 
MobileBanking 0.0157 0.1505 -0.3548*** -0.0239 0.0286 -0.3326*** 
 0.329 0.0849 0.3952 0.0825 0.0707 0.0747 
Log Likelihood -1036.9567 -847.00484 -1060.15 -855.6888 
AIC 2103.913 1724.01 2136.303 1727.378 
BIC 2196.576 1815.26 2185.723 1776.044 
Observations 3,600 3,600 3,240 3,240 3,600 3240 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The coefficients estimated with a conditional Logit model in first experiment and 
second experiment are shown in Table 5-1, which underlies the following utility 
functions. 
𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑛 = −0.2925 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.0684 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑓𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.284 ∗ GuaranteedLoan𝑖𝑗𝑛 
(0.02)                       (0.0248)                (0.0887) 
+0.4994 ∗ CreditLoan𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.4534 ∗ 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.1984 ∗ RCC𝑖𝑗𝑛 
(0.0943)                (0.0746)                 (0.0719) 
0.2081 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.0286 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑛 
                                            (0.0899)                   (0.0707)                                                          5-1 
 
𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑛 = −0.4980 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.2458 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑓𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.185 ∗ GuaranteedLoan𝑖𝑗𝑛 
(0.0252)               (0.0327)                   (0.0969) 
+0.4772 ∗ CreditLoan𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.3524 ∗ 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑛 − 0.0533 ∗ RCC𝑖𝑗𝑛 
(0.0916)                (0.0734)                 (0.0937) 
−0.081 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑛 − 0.3326 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑛 
                                                (0.0898)                (0.0747)                                                                     5-2 
 
where i represents farmers identifier, j represents the alternative that is chosen, and n 
represents choice situation. As is shown in the Table 5-1, all the parameters are 
significant except for mobile banking in the first experiment and except Institution in 
the second experiment. The coefficients reflect utility of the attributes of different 
alternatives. 
The coefficients estimated with a mixed Logit model in first experiment and second 
experiment are shown in Table 5-1, which derives from the following functions: 
𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑛 = −0.3739 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.0936 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑓𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.076 ∗ GuaranteedLoan𝑖𝑗𝑛 
                (0.0301)                (0.04)                  (0.1141) 
+0.5900 ∗ CreditLoan𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.5945 ∗ 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.2952 ∗ RCC𝑖𝑗𝑛 
(0.1165)              (0.1121)                 (0.0936) 
+0.27591 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.0157 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑛 
                                                 (0.1141)                   (0.329)                                                                   5-3 
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𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑛 = −0.5267 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.2598 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑓𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.162 ∗ GuaranteedLoan𝑖𝑗𝑛  
(0.0282)                 (0.04)                 (0.1046) 
+0.4776 ∗ CreditLoan𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.3842 ∗ 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑛 − 0.0833 ∗ RCC𝑖𝑗𝑛 
  (0.1041)                (0.1048)                (0.1078) 
−0.1025 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑛 − 0.3548 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑛 
                                                (0.0976)                    (0.3952)                                                                 5-4 
 
where i represents customer identifier, j represents the alternative that is chosen, and n 
represents choice situation. 
In this model, we assume that the parameters estimated has normal distributions, so 
we could get the mean and standard deviation of the estimators shown in Table 5-1. The 
mixed Logit model explains the heterogeneity of different responses towards same 
attributes of the customers, which gives us more insights. Preference heterogeneity is 
revealed through estimating the standard deviation (Hensher & Rose), which implies 
how the valuation of the total sample spread around the estimated means. 
The results are shown in Table 5-1 column 1, except for mobile banking, all the 
parameters are significant at the 5% confident level at least. After analyzing the 
parameter estimation, the following information can be inferred: the lower the interest 
rate and the longer the term of loan, the higher the utility farmers can get from credit; 
compared with collateral loan, credit loan are more preferred; amortization is more 
popular; three institutions are preferred by the farm households in the following 
sequence (from high to low): RCC (Rural Credit Cooperatives), PSBC (special financial 
institution), ABC (commercial bank).   
Estimation of results of conditional Logit models are shown in appendix and mixed 
Logit models are reported in Table 5-2 and Table 5-3. Both conditional Logit and mixed 
Logit models are highly significant. The estimates in two models are consistent for most 
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of variables with significance and signs. As the mixed Logit model provides richer 
information about heterogeneity in individual, the following discussion will be based 
on mixed Logit. Standard deviation of Term of Loan, Guaranteed Loan and 
Amortization are significant, indicating that the valuations of these attributes are highly 
heterogeneous among respondents whereas the rest attributes valuation are 
homogeneous. 
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Table 5-2 Mixed Logit Results of Different Provinces 
 
 
 Jiangsu Henan Shandong Sichuan Shaanxi 
VARIABLES Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
InterestRate -0.7003*** -0.5128*** -0.3459*** -0.5312*** -0.3201*** 
 0.0574  0.0415  0.0506  0.0676  0.053  
TermofLoan 0.2335*** 0.2631*** 0.3524*** 0.3620*** 0.1589** 0.2555** 0.0177 0.4579*** 0.108 0.4700*** 
 0.0663 0.0865 0.0728 0.0776 0.0661 0.1063 0.0756 0.1187 0.0804 0.1184 
GuaranteedLoan 0.2861 -0.2614 0.072 0.1966 0.0235 0.4565 0.1865 0.4849 0.0646 0.7603** 
 0.1753 0.3581 0.1503 0.2678 0.1897 0.3012 0.2128 0.3783 0.2045 0.3206 
CreditLoan 0.6452*** 0.7613*** 0.4064*** 0.4620** 0.4827** 0.0493 0.5259** 0.0957 0.9395*** 0.6353 
 0.1868 0.2145 0.1468 0.2106 0.2024 0.4799 0.2191 0.3975 0.2354 0.403 
Amortization -0.6864*** 1.4518*** 0.2566* 0.5943*** 0.7732*** 0.8189** 0.3386 1.3318*** 0.7727*** -0.0416 
 0.2296 0.2431 0.1381 0.1765 0.1984 0.32 0.2268 0.3388 0.18 1.1733 
RCC -0.0708* -0.6031*** -0.0033* -0.1041 0.3412** 0.5566 0.198 0.1321 0.3362* -0.575 
 0.1939 0.2275 0.1476 0.1981 0.1692 0.4541 0.1661 0.3773 0.1793 0.3666 
PSBC -0.0612 -0.2537 -0.1386 -0.0071 0.3168 0.6192 0.4057* -0.1054 0.2108 -0.2527 
 0.1652 0.2456 0.143 0.2672 0.2055 0.4867 0.2139 0.3245 0.2053 0.5484 
MobileBanking -0.4544*** -0.2705 -0.3411*** -0.1435 -0.0339 -0.2173 0.2243 -0.516 -0.1104 -0.5512 
 0.1474 0.1896 0.1182 0.2766 0.1488 0.3566 0.1697 0.4319 0.1652 0.3851 
Log Likelihood -383.58448 -430.7824 -338 -329.91702 -347.15222 
AIC 797.169 891.5648 706.0357 689.834 724.3044 
BIC 78.0217 972.4175 781.9042 766.1852 800.6306 
Observations 1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620 1200 1200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 5-3 Conditional Logit Results of Different Provinces 
 
 
 
 Jiangsu Henan Shandong Sichuan Shaanxi 
VARIABLES Decision Decision Decision Decision Decision 
InterestRate -0.5473*** -0.4602*** 0.1113** -0.3761*** -0.2336*** 
 0.038 0.0343 0.0443 0.0368 0.0338 
TermofLoan 0.1779*** 0.3103*** -0.2818*** 0.0071 0.0629 
 0.0472 0.0458 0.035 0.0445 0.0423 
GuaranteedLoan 0.2833** 0.1081 0.0261 0.1248 0.0676 
 0.1427 0.1332 0.1563 0.159 0.1505 
CreditLoan 0.5899*** 0.3804*** 0.4255** 0.3831** 0.7051*** 
 0.1364 0.1252 0.1657 0.1682 0.162 
Amortization -0.4746*** 0.2408** 0.6378*** 0.1569 0.5791*** 
 0.1067 0.1019 0.1337 0.1304 0.1289 
RCC -0.1743 0.0436 0.2465* 0.0884 0.2630** 
 0.1392 0.1282 0.1273 0.1269 0.1247 
PSBC -0.0835 -0.0829 0.2607* 0.2648* 0.1199 
 0.1286 0.1264 0.1579 0.1602 0.1536 
MobileBanking -0.4076*** -0.2798*** 0.002 0.191 -0.1003 
 0.1116 0.1021 0.1254 0.1247 0.1221 
Log Likelihood -408.981 -440.348 -342.21 -341.955 -358.571 
AIC 833.9611 896.6969 700.4197 699.9091 733.1429 
BIC 877.0826 939.8184 740.8829 740.6298 733.8502 
Observations 1,620 1,620 1200 1200 1200 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The coefficients estimated with a mixed Logit model in different provinces are 
shown in Table 5-2, which underlies the following linear utility function: 
𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑛 = −0.7003 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.2335 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑓𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.286 ∗ GuaranteedLoan𝑖𝑗𝑛
    (0.0574)                (0.0663)         (0.1753) 
+0.6452 ∗ CreditLoan𝑖𝑗𝑛 − 0.6864 ∗ 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑛 − 0.0708 ∗ RCC𝑖𝑗𝑛 
   (0.1868)                (0.2296)              (0.1939) 
−0.0612 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑛 − 0.4544 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑛 
                                              (0.1652)                      (0.1474)                                                                 5-5 
 
𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑛 = −0.5128 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.3524 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑓𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.072 ∗ GuaranteedLoan𝑖𝑗𝑛 
 (0.0415)             (0.0728)                (0.1503) 
+0.4064 ∗ CreditLoan𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.2566 ∗ 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑛 − 0.0033 ∗ RCC𝑖𝑗𝑛 
   (0.1468)              (0.1381)                (0.1476) 
−0.1386 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑛 − 0.3411 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑛 
                                             (0.143)                         (0.329)                                                                   5-6 
  
𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑛 = −0.3459 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.1589 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑓𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.023 ∗ GuaranteedLoan𝑖𝑗𝑛 
(0.0506)            (0.0661)                (0.1897) 
+0.4827 ∗ CreditLoan𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.7732 ∗ 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.3412 ∗ RCC𝑖𝑗𝑛 
  (0.2024)               (0.1984)                (0.1692) 
+0.3168 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑛 − 0.0339 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑛 
                                             (0.2055)                       (0.1488)                                                                 5-7 
 
𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑛 = −0.5312 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.0177 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑓𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.186 ∗ GuaranteedLoan𝑖𝑗𝑛 
(0.0676)              (0.0756)                (0.2128) 
+0.5259 ∗ CreditLoan𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.3386 ∗ 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.198 ∗ RCC𝑖𝑗𝑛 
   (0.2191)             (0.2268)                (0.1661) 
+0.4057 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.2243 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑛 
                                                  (0.2139)                     (0.1697)                                                              5-8 
 
𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑛 = −0.3201 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.108 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑓𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.0646 ∗ GuaranteedLoan𝑖𝑗𝑛 
                 (0.053)                 (0.0804)                (0.2045) 
+0.9395 ∗ CreditLoan𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.7727 ∗ 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 0.3362 ∗ RCC𝑖𝑗𝑛 
   (0.2354)              (0.18)                 (0.1793) 
+0.2108 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑛 − 0.1104 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑛 
                                                 (0.2053)                       (0.1652)                                                             5-9 
 
where i represents customer id, j represents the alternative that is chosen, and n 
represents choice situation. 
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In Shandong, as is shown in table 5-2, all the parameters are significant at least at 
5% level except mobile banking attribute. The coefficient of interest rate in five 
provinces are significant at 1% level and the coefficients are negative, which is 
consistent with classical economic theory, implying a downward sloping demand curve. 
Compared with farm household in Shaanxi and Henan, Jiangsu’s famers are more 
preferred to low interest rate.  
The coefficient of term of Loan in all provinces are significant at different level 
except coefficient in Shaanxi. The coefficients of term are positive, indicating that 
consumers (farm households) are reluctant to sign shorter contracts with all other factors 
unchanged. This may be resulted from aversion to risk.  The effect of term of loan on 
credit demand is marginal in Sichuan.  
The coefficients of type of loan in five provinces are similar to some extent.  The 
coefficient of guaranteed loan in five provinces are not significant, which means it does 
not matter when people make choice. As the baseline is collateral loan, we can see from 
the estimation that credit loans are more preferred by the farm households than collateral 
loan because the coefficient of credit loan are positive and significant. This may due to 
the low transaction cost of credit loan. Collateral loan is always the last one to choose 
because it usually requires house property or land property registration and other 
procedures, which makes huge commission fee. 
The coefficients of amortization are significant. In Jiangsu, the sign of the 
coefficient is negative, indicating that farmers here are willing to pay off the loan at 
once. The survey data indicating that economical-level and credit knowledge are pretty 
high in Jiangsu. Due to the economic level, they have the capacity and are willing to 
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pay-off quickly to apply the next round of credit loan. Their loans are mainly used in 
agricultural production and house construction/renovation. The coefficients of 
amortization in the other four provinces are positive. Compared with the baseline (pay 
off at once), they prefer amortization.  
The coefficients of RCC in Jiangsu and Henan are negative and significant at 10% 
confident level.  As the baseline is Agricultural Bank of China (Commercial Bank), the 
estimation shows that farmers prefer Agricultural Bank of China (Commercial Bank).  
The coefficient of RCC in Shaanxi is positive and significant, indicating that people in 
Shaanxi tend to choose RCC as the source of their loan. The coefficient of PSBC reflects 
that farmers in Sichuan are willing to choose PSBC as the source of their loan, compared 
with Agricultural Bank of China.  
Mobile Banking has effect only in Jiangsu and Henan. The negative sign indicates 
farmers in these two provinces are reluctant to choose mobile banking service. The 
coefficients of Mobile Banking in Shandong, Sichuan and Shaanxi are insignificant, 
indicates that mobile banking services are not valued. 
5.2 Willingness to Pay 
Willingness to Pay is applied to measure the change in interest rate associated with 
a unit change in the attribute (Louviere & Hensher, 1982). The function is: 
                                                𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 = −
𝛽𝑖
𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
                                               5-10 
wher 𝛽𝑖 is the estimate for attribute i, 𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 is the estimate for interest rate in 
mixed Logit model.  
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In the mixed Logit model, we keep the coefficient for interest rate fixed. Fixed 
interest rate makes it easier to calculate the distribution of willingness to pay (WTP) for 
each non-interest rate attribute. When the interest rate coefficient is random, the 
distribution of WTP is the ratio of two distributions, which is harder to work with. 
However, if the interest rate is fixed, the distribution of WTP for an attribute has the 
same distribution as the attribute’s coefficient. 
We use the estimated mean coefficients to determine the amount that a farmer with 
average coefficients for interest rate is willing to pay for other parameters. 
Table 5-4 Willing to Pay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The calculated mean WTP measures are presented in Table 5-3, they are calculated 
from the empirical distributions, from which standard errors and confidence intervals 
were estimated. The surveyed farmers valued term of loan, and were willing to pay a 
sizeable premium for longer term of loan, ranging from 0.33 to 0.69. As for the type of 
loan, farmers in five provinces would add an extra 0.41, 0.14, 0.68, 0.35 and 0.20 
respectively to the interest rate for guaranteed loan. The WTP estimates for credit loan 
are high, ranging from 0.92 to 2.94 in five provinces, implying that, compared with 
collateral loan, credit loan is much more preferred.  Holding all other attributes constant, 
credit with amortization would carry interest rate premiums of 0.500, 2.24, 0.64 and 
 Jiangsu Henan Shandong Sichuan Shaanxi 
TermofLoan 0.33343 0.68721 0.4593813 0.03332 0.33739 
GuaranteedLoan 0.40854 0.14041 0.0679387 0.35109 0.20181 
CreditLoan 0.92132 0.79251 1.39549 0.99002 2.93502 
Amortization -0.9802 0.50039 2.2353281 0.63742 2.41393 
RCC -0.1011 -0.0064 0.9864123 0.37274 1.0503 
PSBC -0.0874 -0.2703 0.9158716 0.76374 0.65854 
MobileBanking -0.6489 -0.6652 -0.098005 0.42225 -0.3449 
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2.41 in Henan, Shandong, Sichuan and Shaanxi more than the same credit products with 
pay off at once as repayment method. However, farmers discounted credit with 
amortization at 0.98 less than based credit. The surveyed farmers are willing to pay 
about 1.0, 0.37, 1.05 more for credit from RCC, not from ABC in Shandong, Sichuan 
and Shaanxi. In contrast, farmers in Jiangsu and Henan are willing to pay less for credit 
from RCC than credit from ABC. Farmers’ attitudes to credit from PSBC are similar 
with credit from RCC. The results also show that except for Sichuan province, farmers 
in other four provinces are willing to pay less for mobile banking service.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
Farmers are the core part of rural financial reform, and farmers’ borrowing behavior 
is essential for rural financial markets to fully develop. Understanding farmers’ 
preference for credit product attributes is important. Individual preferences play a 
crucial role in stimulating demand for credit. Based on a review of farmers’ economic 
behavior characteristics, rural financial theories and researches, this study has examined 
the influencing factors of credit demand using discrete choice experiment and mixed 
Logit model. Using survey data from five provinces in rural China, the study found that 
farmers were generally willing to pay more for a host of attributes of loan product. 
Longer term of loan, credit loan, guaranteed loan and amortization loan were found to 
be positively valued by farmers.  
The results of mixed Logit model indicate a downward sloping demand curve for 
credit. The lower of interest rate, the higher credit demand of farmers, which matches 
classic economic theory. Though the benchmark rate has becoming lower these years, 
the interest rate for loans in rural China is capped and allows little flexibility (Jia, 
Heidhues, & Zeller, 2010). To enhance credit demand efficiently, improving demand 
elasticity is important. High education level and flexibility in financial service have been 
shown to have a positive effect on the credit demand elasticity (Turvey, Ma, Kong, & 
Meagher, 2012). Improving education coverage and financial service flexibility, 
therefore, can spur credit demand when interest rates go down.  
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The finding with respect to high preference on longer term loan indicates risk 
attitudes of farmers. Based on our survey, the purpose of the majority of farmer are 
agricultural production, house construction and medical expenses. Agriculture 
production is a long-term activity with seasonal cycles and is vulnerable to nature 
resource and weather. House Construction and medical expenses also requires huge 
investment, which needs longer term to pay off the loan. Therefore, a corresponding 
long-term loan is more preferred than short-term loan for many farmers, even though 
longer term means higher prices.  Long-term is risky to financial institutions, resulting 
in a reluctant attitude to issuing long-term loan. A loan which can adapted to seasonal 
agriculture production can significantly exert positive influence on farmer’s credit 
demand.  
The high WTP found in credit and guaranteed loan suggests that farm household 
favored loan with lower transaction cost both in money and time. They are also willing 
to pay for loan with flexible procedures. Nevertheless, for security concern, financial 
institutions expand collateral business line meanwhile cut-down credit and guaranteed 
loan business line. In rural China, agricultural land management mortgage reform has 
been carried out for several years. More and more farmer collateralize their land 
property to get loan from bank. At the end of 2016, the balance of land property 
mortgage in 232 counties was 14 billion yuan. The balance of house mortgage loan in 
59 counties was 12.6 billion yuan. Collateral loan will be enhanced through completing 
land property mortgage system and law regulations. Improving service efficiency and 
flexibility as well as lowering transaction cost could definitely dig out more credit 
demand.  
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The respondents in our study are more likely to choose amortization as repayment 
method (except for farmers in Jiangsu). This suggests that with increasing requirement 
of large amount loan, paying off the loan at once is impractical and unsatisfied for loan 
applicants. Amortization cannot only ease the pressure of borrowers but also guarantee 
liquidity of financial institutions. For farmer who borrow small amount of loan, she/he 
has capacity to pay-off the loan at once and could continue to apply for a new loan. 
However, a large amount of people prefer to pay back portion of loan.  
WTP of financial institutions vary from province to province, which may be 
explained by distinct financial environment. RCC is one of the major government- 
regulated source of rural credit in rural China. Compared with commercial bank like 
ABC and PSBC, RCC has customer resource, brand resource and market resource 
advantages. RCC is an institution with credibility, which is the most appealing attraction 
for farm household. This can explain high market shares of agricultural loan. RCC tend 
to be more commercial rather than cooperative during recent reforms, which enables 
RCC to provide more flexible and professional service. 
Though smartphone coverage is wide, the insignificant estimates of parameters and 
negative sign of WTP indicates that Mobile Banking services have no contribution to 
attracting customers. The result implies that farmers remain neutral of mobile banking 
service when it comes to credit demand.  
From the survey data, education level affects credit demand directly and indirectly. The 
higher the educational level, the more the credit demand of farmers in our sample. High 
education could also enhance farmers’ perception of finance, which not only spurs 
farmers willingness to borrow loan but also enables them improve risk management. 
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Consequently, with improve financial education, the credit demand will likely rise in 
rural China.
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APPENDIX 
Example of first-round Survey and Choice Experiment: Credit 
Cornell University, Sichuan Agricultural University, Northwest Agricultural and 
Forestry University, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Central 
University of Finance and Economics 
Survey of Villagers to Assess Crop Insurance, Credit and Land Transfers 
  
NARRATIVE TO BE READ TO RESPONDENTS: First of all I would like to thank 
you for taking the time to meet with us. This survey should take approximately 10 
minutes and again I thank you for your time. The survey we are conducting is a joint 
product between The Central University of Finance and Economics, Sichuan 
Agricultural University, Northwest Agriculture and Forestry University and Cornell 
University in the United States. We are interested in collecting information in relation 
to credit. Your responses will be completely confidential and under no circumstances 
will your responses be identifiable. In addition we understand that you may not have 
all of the precise information available. In these cases all we ask is that you provide us 
with your best estimates or best judgments. Finally, you have the right to refuse to 
answer any question we might ask. 
  
Given these objectives are you willing to participate in this survey?  Yes No 
If NO then “Ok, that is fine. For our records can you tell us why you do not want to 
participate? 
NOTE to interviewer: If answer above is because respondent does not feel they have 
the information we need then ask why and explain again that we only require a best 
effort on their part, and that we expect that not all respondents will have precise 
information. And then ask if they will reconsider. 
 NOTE to interviewer: If answer above is related to privacy issues, then remind 
respondent that their participation will be most helpful to our research and that they 
will remain anonymous and that their privacy is guaranteed. And then ask if they will 
reconsider. 
 IF YES….” Thank you very much for your consent. Let us begin. We would like to 
start off by asking some general questions about your farm household”……. Go to 
question 1. DO NOT RECORD NAME OF RESPONDENT 
 
Village  _______________________________________________                  
Date   _________ 
Interviewer  ___________________________________
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A: Choice Experiment 
Assume that you are going to apply credit. If you could only choose from the following 
two choices. Which one would you choose? (Please check only one of the boxes at the 
bottom of this page). 
 
Interviewers should explain the meanings of each attribute to respondents. 
 
Type of payment: pay off at one and amortization. Pay off at once means borrowers 
pays off the principal and interest of the loan at one time before or when the loan expires. 
Amortization is a way that the principal of the loan will be repaid in equal amounts with 
decreasing interest every month during the loan period 
Type of institution: bank provides the loan, China's rural credit market is mainly served 
by Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and Postal 
Savings Bank of China (PSBC). 
Mobile Banking Service: bank providing mobile banking services to customers. 
 
Certainty degree: from low to high, 1-5 
 
The following choices provide you the transaction situations, which one you prefer to 
credit? 
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Farm Characteristics and Farmer Risk Attitude 
 
number question 
 
unit response 
A1 farm 
characteristics 
gender 0=female，1=male 
 
A2 age age 
 
A3 Including yourself 
how many people 
live in this house  
number of people 
 
A4 How many members 
of your household are 
primarily involved in 
agricultural work 
number of people 
 
A5 How many members 
of your household 
earn off-farm wages 
number of people 
 
A6 Are you the primary 
decision maker in 
agricultural affairs 
0=no，1=yes 
 
A7 Do any household 
members work for 
village leader, village 
committee, state 
government, county 
government, state 
enterprise, and RCC 
or banks)  
0=no，1=yes 
 
A8 What is your 
education level  
0=Never Went to 
School，1=At least 
elementary school，
2=At least middle 
school ，3=At least 
high school ，
4=Some University 
or college，
5=Completed 
College or University 
 
A9 How many years 
have you been 
farming 
year 
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A10 Compared with other 
farmers, your ability 
of cultivation is 
better 
1=Strongly 
Disagree，
2=Moderately  
Disagree ，
3=Agree，
4=Moderately 
Agree，5=Strongly 
Agree  
 
A11 What is the total size 
of your household 
farm (Mu, allocated 
Land Use rights, 
excluding land rented 
in)  
mu 
 
A12 How much land do 
you rent in for 
agricultural use (total 
mu rented) 
mu 
 
A13 In general, how 
would you describe 
the current 
agricultural business 
in your area 
compared to last year 
1=GETTING 
WORSE, 2=ABOUT 
THE 
SAME,3=GETTING 
BETTER 
 
A14 Please list the top 
five crops you have 
grown in the past 12 
months from the 
most valuable to the 
least valuable   
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
A15 Farm income yuan 
 
A16 Off-farm income yuan 
 
A17 Total income yuan 
 
A18 Productive 
expenditure 
yuan 
 
A19 Household 
Consumption 
expenditures (food, 
yuan 
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clothes, health, 
education, etc) 
A20 Other expenditures 
(e.g. car, house, 
vacation travel) 
yuan 
 
A21 Gross Incomes minus 
Expenditures 
yuan 
 
B1 Sources of 
Risk and Risk 
Perceptions 
Accepting greater 
production risks to 
increase the chance 
of higher profits is 
important to me  
1=Strongly 
Disagree，
2=Moderately  
Disagree ，
3=Agree，
4=Moderately 
Agree，5=Strongly 
Agree  
 
B2 I am more likely to 
take risks with new 
agricultural 
technologies 
(mechanical or 
management 
practices or input 
use) before I see 
good results on other 
farms  
1=Strongly 
Disagree，
2=Moderately  
Disagree ，
3=Agree，
4=Moderately 
Agree，5=Strongly 
Agree  
 
B3 I am willing to take 
risks with new 
management 
practices before I see 
good results in other 
farms  
1=Strongly 
Disagree，
2=Moderately  
Disagree ，
3=Agree，
4=Moderately 
Agree，5=Strongly 
Agree  
 
B4 Diversifying my crop 
(including livestock) 
mix in order to 
reduce risk is 
important to me  
1=Strongly 
Disagree，
2=Moderately  
Disagree ，
3=Agree，
4=Moderately 
Agree，5=Strongly 
Agree  
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B5 Having different 
Fields or farms at 
different locations 
(geographic 
diversification) is 
important to me  
1=Strongly 
Disagree，
2=Moderately  
Disagree ，
3=Agree，
4=Moderately 
Agree，5=Strongly 
Agree  
 
B6 I would consider 
growing more risky 
crops if I had (or 
have) greater access 
to irrigation  
1=Strongly 
Disagree，
2=Moderately  
Disagree ，
3=Agree，
4=Moderately 
Agree，5=Strongly 
Agree  
 
B7  I would, or do, sell 
my agricultural 
products over a 
period of time rather 
than at harvest in 
order to reduce 
market price risk  
(diversified 
marketing)  
1=Strongly 
Disagree，
2=Moderately  
Disagree ，
3=Agree，
4=Moderately 
Agree，5=Strongly 
Agree  
 
B8 I have (or would if I 
could) made some 
non-farm investments 
in new business, or 
financial assets like 
stocks and bonds in 
order to diversify 
household income.  
1=Strongly 
Disagree，
2=Moderately  
Disagree ，
3=Agree，
4=Moderately 
Agree，5=Strongly 
Agree  
 
B9 I am willing to 
ACCEPT more risk 
in all aspects of life 
relative to my peers 
(other farmers that 
you know)  
1=Strongly 
Disagree，
2=Moderately  
Disagree ，
3=Agree，
4=Moderately 
Agree，5=Strongly 
Agree  
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B10 In general, I believe 
that I TAKE more 
risks in all aspects of 
life than my peers.  
1=Strongly 
Disagree，
2=Moderately  
Disagree ，
3=Agree，
4=Moderately 
Agree，5=Strongly 
Agree  
 
C1 Precautionary 
Savings 
What proportion of 
Household income 
(define income here 
as revenues minus 
productive expenses 
minus consumption 
and other non-
productive 
expenditures) are you 
able to save in a year 
1=none，2=less than 
5%，3=3%-5%，
4=more than 10% 
 
C2 I save in case my 
house needs repair  
1=Strongly 
Disagree，
2=Moderately  
Disagree ，
3=Agree，
4=Moderately 
Agree，5=Strongly 
Agree  
 
C3 I save in case my 
automobile (e.g. car, 
motorcycle, tractor) 
breaks down. 
1=Strongly 
Disagree，
2=Moderately  
Disagree ，
3=Agree，
4=Moderately 
Agree，5=Strongly 
Agree  
 
C4 I save in case I 
cannot repay a loan 
from earnings.  
1=Strongly 
Disagree，
2=Moderately  
Disagree ，
3=Agree，
4=Moderately 
Agree，5=Strongly 
Agree  
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C5 I save for unexpected 
medical emergency  
1=Strongly 
Disagree，
2=Moderately  
Disagree ，
3=Agree，
4=Moderately 
Agree，5=Strongly 
Agree  
 
C6 I save in case I lose 
my job  
1=Strongly 
Disagree，
2=Moderately  
Disagree ，
3=Agree，
4=Moderately 
Agree，5=Strongly 
Agree  
 
C7 I save for 
unanticipated crop 
loss.  
1=Strongly 
Disagree，
2=Moderately  
Disagree ，
3=Agree，
4=Moderately 
Agree，5=Strongly 
Agree  
 
C8 
 
In your opinion, do 
you think saving is 
important?   
1=Strongly 
unimportant，
2=Moderately 
unimportant，
3=important，
4=Moderately 
important，
5=Strongly important 
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Credit History and Credit Demand 
1. Have your ever heard about credit 
a. I have never heard of a credit 
b. I am aware of credit but am not sure of its purpose.         
c. I am very familiar with credit 
d. I have applied credit 
2. To what extent you know about land transfer center and land bank   
a. I have never heard of a Land Transfer Center (or Land Bank) 
b. I am aware of Land Transfer Centers, but am not sure of its purpose.         
c. I am very familiar with Land Transfer Centers 
d. I have had personal contact with a Land Transfer Center   
 
3. How did you learn about land transfer center and land bank 
a. The Land Transfer Center contacted me with information 
b. My financial institution (RCC or bank) informed me  
c. The village leader informed me and other villagers  
d. Government provided information  
e. I was told of Land Transfer Centers by a friend or relative 
f. I saw information about Land Transfer Centers from public media such 
as television or the internet 
4. Do you have credit demand 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
5. What's the purpose of credit 
a. Agricultural production                                  
b. House construction/renovation                        
c. Purchase of car/motorcycle/bicycle                  
d. Household consumption                                  
e. Medical expenses                                           
f. Education expenses    
  
6. What is your preferred term of loan 
a. less than half year  
b. more than half year and less than 1 year_  
c. 1-3 years  
d. 3-5 years  
e. 5-30 years 
     
7. What is your preferred source of credit 
a. Friends and Relatives 
b. Formal financial institutions (RCC ABC)   
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c. Informal Institutions (e.g. marketing cooperative, supply cooperative 
etc.)    
d. Others 
 
8. If you get a loan from formal institution, which one do you choose 
a. RCC 
b. Agriculture Bank of China 
c. Postal and Saving Bank of China 
d. Others 
 
9. Which type of loan you prefer to get from the institution 
a. Credit Loan 
b. Collateral Loan 
c. Group Guaranteed Loan 
 
10.   What type of repayment you prefer to repay loan 
a. Pay off at once 
b. Amortization 
 
11.   Do you think is it important for you to decide credit product if there is mobile 
banking service 
a. Yes 
b.  No 
12.   Time you firstly apply and receive loan_____ 
 
13.   Did you apply credit in the last year 
a. Yes 
b.  No 
 
14.   If yes, please fill the form
 
 
 Loan Amount Annual Interest Rate 
I owe no debt to institutions  
or friends or relatives 
0 none 
Friends/Relatives     
Formal Lenders  
(RCC, ABC, Postal Savings, etc.) 
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Informal Institutions 
(Money Lender/ Pawn Shop) 
    
Other (Land Transfer Center)     
 
15.  If yes, what's the purpose of credit 
a.  Agricultural production                                  
b.  House construction/renovation                        
c.  Purchase of car/motorcycle/bicycle                  
d.  Household consumption                                 
e.  Medical expenses                                         
f.  Education expenses    
 
16. If you get loan from formal Institutions, please answer the following question 
a. If you get a loan from formal institution, which one do you choose 
i. RCC 
ii. ABC  
iii. Village Bank 
iv. Others 
b. Which kind of loan you get from the institution 
i. Credit Loan  
ii. Collateral Loan  
iii. Group Guaranteed Loan 
c. What’s the reason for you to choose the institution above 
i. Lower interest rate   
ii. Flexible repayment method 
iii. Longer term 
iv. Better service quality 
v. Lower transaction cost 
vi. Other 
17.   Do you need more credit   
a. Yes 
b. No   
 
18.   Based on the asset, income and loan, what do you think of your credit 
a. Very low, need more loan, have no repayment risk  
b. Relatively low, want to have more loan, have some repayment risk 
c. Enough, the loan could satisfy the production demand 
d. Relatively high, have repayment risk 
e. Very high, have high repayment risk 
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19. Thinking about current interest rates charged by your local RCC or bank, if the 
interest rate was increased by 3% points (e.g. from 6% to 9%) would you 
a. Borrow a lot less 
b. Borrow less   
c. Borrow about the same amount 
d. Borrow more 
e. Borrow a lot more 
 
20.  Thinking about current interest rates charged by your local RCC of bank, if 
the interest rate was reduced by 3% (e.g. from 6% to 3%) would you  
a. Borrow a lot less 
b. Borrow less   
c. Borrow about the same amount 
d. Borrow more 
e. Borrow a lot more 
 
21.  Did you buy the crop insurance 
a. Yes 
b. No   
 
22. Did you buy the any other kinds of insurance, such as endowment insurance, 
accident insurance, or property insurance 
a. Yes 
b. No   
 
23. Have you bought any other kinds of insurance, such as endowment insurance, 
accident insurance, or property insurance 
a. Yes 
b. No   
 
24. If yes, what kind of insurance you have bought: 
a. Endowment insurance, 
b. Medical insurance 
c. Employment injury insurance 
d. Unemployment insurance 
e. Others 
 
25. I believe that access to credit would become far more important to me if I were 
to increase my farming operation by renting land (production rights) from a 
Land Transfer Center or from private individuals.  
 
Strongly Disagree____ Moderately Disagree _____ Agree_____ Moderately 
Agree_____ Strongly Agree _____   
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To be answered by interviewer only 
  
1. In your opinion the respondent was engaged in this survey and answered truthfully 
all questions? Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  
____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
2. In your opinion the quality of answers provided in this survey is adequate to 
include in any written reports. Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  
____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
  
Please make any other relevant comments here:
Example of first-round Survey and Choice Experiment: Credit (Chinese) 
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康奈尔大学，四川农业大学，西北农林科技大学，山东财经大学，中央财经大
学 
农村信贷调研农户问卷(“信贷”选择) 
 
 
采访者需告知受访者: 首先，感谢您花费宝贵的时间接受我们的问卷采访。此次
问卷采访需要花费您 20 分钟左右的时间。此次问卷调查是由中央财经大学，四
川农业大学，山东财经大学，西北农林科技大学，美国康奈尔大学针对土地流
转、作物保险、农村信贷合作科研项目发起的实地调研。 
 
我们承诺：调查只涉及科学研究，不涉及商业活动，并对获取信息保密。除此
之外，我们了解到您可能会对部分问题没有确切答案，在这种情况下，我们希
望您能做出合理猜测或预估。最后，我们尊重您不参与调查的权利。 
谢谢您的合作。祝您工作顺利，万事如意！ 
 
 
针对上述内容，您是否愿意参与此次调查 
是__________        否__________ 
若您不愿意参与此次调查，我们恳请您告知拒绝参与调查的原因： 
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采访者须知：如果受访者不愿参与调查，是担心本次问卷涉及到个人隐私，请
再次向其强调“本次调研完全匿名，并对获取信息保密，且您的参与对您们的调
查极为重要”。随后请再次确认受访者意愿。 
 
若受访者同意参与调查：非常感谢您的参与。下面我们将从询问您选择题开
始。 
 
 
 
镇（街）名称 _________________ 
村名      _________________ 
调查者 _________________ 
调查日期 _________________ 
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第一部分：选择题 
采访者需向受访者解释各指标含义： 
采访者需向受访者解释各指标含义： 
还款方式：分为分期偿还贷款与一次性还清贷款。其中分期偿还贷款是指借款
人在规定期限内分期还款包括等额本息还款、等额本金还款、按期付息还本、
等额递增（减）等；一次性还清贷款是指借款人在贷款到期时一次性还清贷款
的本息。 
贷款银行：指提供贷款的银行，本问卷将贷款银行根据属性不同分为农村信用
合作社、股份制商业银行以及邮政储蓄银行。其中，农信社（农商行）代表农
村信用合作社、中国农业银行、村镇银行等代表股份制商业银行。 
手机银行：指贷款银行向顾客提供手机银行服务，即农户可利用手机等移动终
端办理相关银行业务。 
您的选择肯定程度：指农户在做出选择后，对于该选择的肯定程度，肯定程度
由 1-5 依次上升） 
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卡片 1：假设您有贷款需求，如果您只能从以下两种贷款中进行选择，下列哪一
个是您的选择（请在选项下方一栏中标出您的选择）并勾选您选择的肯定程
度。 
 贷款 1 贷款 2 
贷款利率 12% 14% 
还款期限 5-30年 3-5年 
贷款类型 信用贷款 担保贷款 
还款方式 一次性还清贷款 分期偿还贷款 
贷款银行 股份制商业银行 邮政储蓄银行 
手机银行 是 是 
您的选择   
您的选择肯定程度 1   2   3   4   5    
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卡片 2：假设您有贷款需求，如果您只能从以下两种贷款中进行选择，下列哪一
个是您的选择（请在选项下方一栏中标出您的选择）并勾选您选择的肯定程
度。 
 贷款 1 贷款 2 
贷款利率 14% 6% 
还款期限 0-0.5年 1-3年 
贷款类型 担保贷款 担保贷款 
还款方式 一次性还清贷款 分期偿还贷款 
贷款银行 股份制商业银行 股份制商业银行 
手机银行 是 是 
您的选择   
您的选择肯定程度 1   2   3   4   5    
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卡片 3：假设您有贷款需求，如果您只能从以下两种贷款中进行选择，下列哪一
个是您的选择（请在选项下方一栏中标出您的选择）并勾选您选择的肯定程
度。 
 贷款 1 贷款 2 
贷款利率 8% 2% 
还款期限 3-5 年 1-3 年 
贷款类型 信用贷款 担保贷款 
还款方式 分期偿还贷款 分期偿还贷款 
贷款银行 邮政储蓄银行 股份制商业银行 
手机银行 是 是 
您的选择   
您的选择肯定程度 1   2   3   4   5    
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卡片 4：假设您有贷款需求，如果您只能从以下两种贷款中进行选择，下列哪一
个是您的选择（请在选项下方一栏中标出您的选择）并勾选您选择的肯定程
度。 
 贷款 1 贷款 2 
贷款利率 14% 12% 
还款期限 3-5 年 5-30 年 
贷款类型 抵押贷款 担保贷款 
还款方式 一次性还清贷款 一次性还清贷款 
贷款银行 农信社 邮政储蓄银行 
手机银行 否 是 
您的选择   
您的选择肯定程度 1   2   3   4   5    
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卡片 5：假设您有贷款需求，如果您只能从以下两种贷款中进行选择，下列哪一
个是您的选择（请在选项下方一栏中标出您的选择）并勾选您选择的肯定程
度。 
 贷款 1 贷款 2 
贷款利率 2% 6% 
还款期限 0.5-1 年 0-0.5 年 
贷款类型 担保贷款 信用贷款 
还款方式 分期偿还贷款 分期偿还贷款 
贷款银行 邮政储蓄银行 股份制商业银行 
手机银行 是 是 
您的选择   
您的选择肯定程度 1   2   3   4   5    
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卡片 6：假设您有贷款需求，如果您只能从以下两种贷款中进行选择，下列哪一
个是您的选择（请在选项下方一栏中标出您的选择）并勾选您选择的肯定程
度。 
 贷款 1 贷款 2 
贷款利率 4% 12% 
还款期限 3-5 年 0-0.5 年 
贷款类型 担保贷款 信用贷款 
还款方式 分期偿还贷款 分期偿还贷款 
贷款银行 股份制商业银行 邮政储蓄银行 
手机银行 是 是 
您的选择   
您的选择肯定程度 1   2   3   4   5    
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第二部分：基本信息 
采访者：本部分由人口及经济状况，风险意识，以及储蓄预防意识三部分组
成，以表格的形式展现。请采访者就表格中的内容向受访者提问 
 
序号 问题 
 
单位 回答 
A1 人口及
经济状
况 
性别 0=女，1=男  
A2 年龄 岁  
A3 总人数（户籍人数） 人数  
A4 主要在家务农人数 人数  
A5 主要在外打工人数 人数  
A6 您是否为家中农业事
务上的第一决策者 
0=否，1=是  
A7 您家中成员是否参与
村干部、村委会、农
村信用合作社等银
行、县市政府的工作 
0=否，1=是  
A8 您的受教育程度 1=未上学，2=小学，3=初中， 
4=高中，5=职业学校或大学， 
6=已完成本科 
 
A9 您从事农业生产已经
多少年 
年  
A10 和同村其他农民相
比，我的耕作能力更
强 
1=非常不同意，2=不同意， 
3=同意，4=比较同意，5=非常
同意 
 
A11 您承包地总面积（不
包括土地流转）  
亩  
A12 您通过流转用于农业
生产土地总面积 
亩  
A13 您觉得目前本地区的
农业产业形势和去年
相比（农产品市场价
格，政策导向等） 
1=变差，2=持平，3=变好  
A14 请您列举去年内所耕
种的 5种作物，按价
值从高到低 
1  
 
2   
3   
4   
5  
A15 农业收入 元  
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A16 非农业收入 元  
A17 总收入 元  
A18 生产支出1 元  
A19 生活消费开支2 元  
A20 其他支出3 元  
A21 收入盈余4 元  
B1 风险意
识 
您愿意接受更高的生
产风险去增加更高收
益的可能性 
1=非常不愿意，2=比较不愿
意， 
3=愿意，4=比较愿意，5=非常
愿意 
 
B2 您愿意接受更高的风
险首先尝试新的农业
技术 
（和同村其他人相
比） 
1=非常不愿意，2=比较不愿
意， 
3=愿意，4=比较愿意，5=非常
愿意 
 
B3 您愿意接受更高的风
险去首先尝试新的农
业经营理念 
（和同村其他人相
比） 
1=非常不愿意，2=比较不愿
意， 
3=愿意，4=比较愿意，5=非常
愿意 
 
B4 您愿意通过种植多样
化品种来降低风险 
1=非常不愿意，2=比较不愿
意， 
3=愿意，4=比较愿意，5=非常
愿意 
 
B5 您愿意通过分散种植
区域（地理多样化）
来降低种植风险 
1=非常不愿意，2=比较不愿
意， 
3=愿意，4=比较愿意，5=非常
愿意 
 
B6 您愿意在更好的灌溉
条件下，种植更具风
险的作物（去增加更
高收益的可能性） 
1=非常不愿意，2=比较不愿
意， 
3=愿意，4=比较愿意，5=非常
愿意 
 
B7 相比在收获时节出售
农产品，您更愿意在
分散时间段出售来降
低市场价格风险 
1=非常不愿意，2=比较不愿
意， 
3=愿意，4=比较愿意，5=非常
愿意 
 
                                                      
1 主要包括农、林、牧、副、渔各业产品所耗费的种籽、饲料、燃料、生产工人工资、农机具折
旧以及因管理生产和为生产服务而发生的各种费用 
2 主要包括衣食住行、子女教育、医疗支出日常生活所涉及的支出等 
3
 主要包括非生产支出及非生活消费支出，例如：红白喜事、娱乐消费等。 
4 收入盈余=总收入-总支出 
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B8 您愿意进行非农投资
或者购买金融资产
（例如股票、债券）
降低收入单一化的风
险 
1=非常不愿意，2=比较不愿
意， 
3=愿意，4=比较愿意，5=非常
愿意 
 
B9 相对于同村其他人，
您更能够接受风险 
1=非常不同意，2=比较不同
意， 
3=同意，4=比较同意，5=非常
同意 
 
B10 相对于同村其他人，
您承担了更多的风险 
1=非常不同意，2=比较不同
意， 
3=同意，4=比较同意，5=非常
同意 
 
C1 储蓄及 
预防意
识 
您储蓄的份额占您纯
收入的多少 
1=不存钱，2=少于 5%， 
3=5%-10%，4=多于 10% 
 
C2 您存款是担心住房需
要整修 
1=非常不同意，2=比较不同
意， 
3=同意，4=比较同意，5=非常
同意 
 
C3 您存款是担心交通工
具需要维修 
1=非常不同意，2=比较不同
意， 
3=同意，4=比较同意，5=非常
同意 
 
C4 您存款是担心紧急医
疗事故发生 
1=非常不同意，2=比较不同
意， 
3=同意，4=比较同意，5=非常
同意 
 
C5 您存款是担心收入不
足以支付贷款 
1=非常不同意，2=比较不同
意， 
3=同意，4=比较同意，5=非常
同意 
 
C6 您存款是担心您失去
日常经济来源（失
业） 
1=非常不同意，2=比较不同
意， 
3=同意，4=比较同意，5=非常
同意 
 
C7 您存款是担心预料外
的农业生产损失 
1=非常不同意，2=比较不同
意， 
3=同意，4=比较同意，5=非常
同意 
 
C8 在您看来，存款储蓄
是否重要 
1=非常不重要，2=比较不重
要， 
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3=重要，4=比较重要，5=非常
重要 
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第三部分：信贷水平与需求 
 
采访者： 
 
D1. 您对贷款是否有一定了解:_______ 
a. 您从未听说过 
b. 听说过，不了解其业务或功能 
c. 比较了解 
d. 非常了解，且办理过此业务 
D2. 您对土地流转中心或土地银行等流转平台的了解程度:_______ 
a. 您从未听说过土地流转中心或土地银行 
b. 您知道土地流转中心，不了解其业务或功能 
c. 您很了解土地流转中心或土地银行等流转平台 
d. 您和土地流转中心等流转平台已有联系或合作 
D3. 如果您了解土地流转中心等平台, 您是通过什么途径了解的(可多
选):_______ 
 a. 土地流转中心上门联系，提供信息 
 b. 通过农村金融借贷组织的宣传了解 
 c. 基层组织（村委会等）鼓励宣传 
 d. 政府等相关部门的宣传，提供信息 
 e. 通过朋友亲戚的告知宣传 
 f. 公众渠道的信息宣传，例如电视或网站（土流网等） 
D4. 您是否有贷款需求: 
a. 是    b. 否 
D5. 若有贷款需求，您的贷款目的是什么（可多选）:_______ 
 a. 农业生产                   
 b. 修建房屋或房屋翻修 
 c. 购买或维修交通工具 
 d. 生活日常消费 
 e. 医疗开销    
 f. 子女教育 
D7. 若有贷款需求，您更倾向于以下哪个还款期限（可多选）:_______ 
 a. 少于半年 
 b. 半年到一年 
 c. 一年到三年 
 d. 三年到五年 
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 e. 五年到三十年   
D8. 若有贷款需求，您更倾向于哪种贷款来源:_______ 
 a. 亲戚和朋友  
 b. 正规金融机构 
 c. 非正规金融机构 
 d. 其他(描述并填写) 
D9. 若为正规金融机构，您更倾向于哪个机构:_______ 
a. 农村信用合作社 
 b. 股份制商业银行 
 c. 邮政储蓄银行 
 d. 其他 
D10. 若为正规金融机构，您更倾向于获得哪种贷款:_______ 
       a. 信用贷款        b. 担保贷款        c. 抵押贷款 
D11. 若为正规金融机构，您更倾向于哪种还款方式:_______ 
a. 一次性还清贷款  b. 分期偿还贷款 
D12. 您认为贷款银行提供手机银行业务对您选择贷款是否重要:_______ 
a. 是  b. 否 
D13. 您第一次申请贷款并获得贷款的时间:______ 
D14 .您是否在过去的一年时间里，有过借贷行为           
a. 是  b. 否 
D15. 若有，请填写以下表格 
 借款金额（元） 借款利率（年） 
从亲戚朋友处获取借款   
从正规机构获得借款(农信社、农业银行等)   
从非正规金融机构处获得借款(典当、高利贷等)   
其他   
 
D16. 若有，您的贷款用途为（可多选）:_______ 
 a. 农业生产 
 b. 购买或修建房屋 
 c. 购买或维修交通工具 
 d. 生活日常消费  
 e. 医疗开销  
 f. 子女教育 
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D17. 如果您从正规金融借款，请回答以下问题 
        a. 您是从以下哪个机构获得:_______ 
  i. 农村信用合作社 
  ii.股份制商业银行 
  iii.邮政储蓄银行 
  iv.其他 
        b. 您选择此机构的原因是:_______ 
   i. 贷款利率低 
   ii.还款期限灵活 
   iii.还款期限长 
   iv.服务质量高 
   v.贷款成本低 
   vi.其他 
       c. 您的贷款类型是什么:_______ 
  i.信用贷款 
  ii.抵押贷款 
  iii.担保贷款  
D18. 您有更多的信贷需求吗:_______ 
a. 是    b. 否 
D19. 根据您目前的资产、负债和生产收入，您认为您的贷款水平:_______ 
 a. 非常低，您仍需要更多的贷款，且无还款风险 
 b. 较低，您可以获得更多贷款，但有一定还款风险 
 c. 足够，您现阶段的贷款满足您的生产需求 
 d. 比较高，具有一定还款风险 
 e. 非常高，有较高还款风险 
D20. 基于当前的贷款利率（农信社或银行），如果贷款年利率增长 3% 
（例如：从 6%涨至 9%）:_______ 
 a. 很大程度上减少贷款  
 b. 减少贷款  
 c. 不改变贷款金额 
 d. 增多贷款  
 e. 很大程度上增多贷款 
D21. 基于当前的贷款利率（农信社或银行），如果贷款年利率减少 3% 
（例如：从 6%跌至 3%）:_______ 
 a. 很大程度上减少贷款  
 b. 减少贷款  
 c. 不改变贷款金额 
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 d. 增多贷款  
 e. 很大程度上增多贷款 
D22. 您是否购买农业保险:_______                            
a. 是    b. 否 
D23．您是否购买其他保险（如:养老保险、医疗保险等）:_______        
a. 是    b. 否 
D24. 您认为购买农业保险对于获得贷款是否重要:_______ 
 a. 非常不重要        b. 比较不重要        c. 重要  
      d. 比较重要          e. 非常重要 
D25. 您认为获得贷款对于通过土地流入（从土地流转中心或者从私人处） 
扩大生产是否重要:_______ 
 a. 非常不重要        b. 比较不重要        c. 重要  
      d. 比较重要          e. 非常重要
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第四部分：调研者回答 
 
1. 在您看来，受访者有认真参与调查，并真实回答问题吗？ 
        非常不同意______     比较不同意_______     同意_______  
比较同意_______      非常不同意_________ 
2. 在您看来，以上问卷结果能用于正是研究报告吗？ 
非常不同意______     比较不同意_______     同意_______  
比较同意_______      非常不同意_________ 
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Example of second-round Survey and Choice Experiment: Credit 
Cornell University, Sichuan Agricultural University, Northwest Agricultural and 
Forestry University, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Central 
University of Finance and Economics 
Survey of Villagers to Assess Crop Insurance, Credit and Land Transfers 
  
NARRATIVE TO BE READ TO RESPONDENTS: First of all I would like to thank you 
for taking the time to meet with us. This survey should take approximately 10 minutes 
and again I thank you for your time. The survey we are conducting is a joint product 
between The Central University of Finance and Economics, Sichuan Agricultural 
University, Northwest Agriculture and Forestry University and Cornell University in 
the United States. We are interested in collecting information in relation to credit. 
Your responses will be completely confidential and under no circumstances will your 
responses be identifiable. In addition we understand that you may not have all of the 
precise information available. In these cases all we ask is that you provide us with 
your best estimates or best judgments. Finally, you have the right to refuse to answer 
any question we might ask. 
  
Given these objectives are you willing to participate in this survey?  Yes No 
If NO then “Ok, that is fine. For our records can you tell us why you do not want to 
participate? 
NOTE to interviewer: If answer above is because respondent does not feel they have 
the information we need then ask why and explain again that we only require a best 
effort on their part, and that we expect that not all respondents will have precise 
information. And then ask if they will reconsider. 
 NOTE to interviewer: If answer above is related to privacy issues, then remind 
respondent that their participation will be most helpful to our research and that they 
will remain anonymous and that their privacy is guaranteed. And then ask if they will 
reconsider. 
 IF YES….” Thank you very much for your consent. Let us begin. We would like to 
start off by asking some general questions about your farm household”……. Go to 
question 1. DO NOT RECORD NAME OF RESPONDENT 
 
Village  _______________________________________________                  
Date   _________ 
Interviewer  ___________________________________ 
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A: Choice Experiment 
Assume that you are going to apply credit. If you could only choose from the 
following two choices. Which one would you choose? (Please check only one of the 
boxes at the bottom of this page). 
 
Interviewers should explain the meanings of each attribute to respondents. 
 
Type of payment: pay off at one and amortization. Pay off at once means borrowers 
pays off the principal and interest of the loan at one time before or when the loan 
expires. Amortization is a way that the principal of the loan will be repaid in equal 
amounts with decreasing interest every month during the loan period 
Type of institution: bank provides the loan, China's rural credit market is mainly 
served by Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and 
Postal Savings Bank of China (PSBC). 
Mobile Banking Service: bank providing mobile banking services to customers. 
 
Certainty degree: from low to high, 1-5 
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Farm Characteristics and Farmer Risk Attitude 
 
number question 
 
unit response 
A1 farm 
characteristics 
gender 0=female，1=male 
 
A2 age age 
 
A3 Including yourself 
how many people 
live in this house  
number of people 
 
A4 How many 
members of your 
household are 
primarily involved 
in agricultural work 
number of people 
 
A5 How many 
members of your 
household earn off-
farm wages 
number of people 
 
A6 Are you the primary 
decision maker in 
agricultural affairs 
0=no，1=yes 
 
A7 Do any household 
members work for 
village leader, 
village committee, 
state government, 
county government, 
state enterprise, and 
RCC or banks)  
0=no，1=yes 
 
A8 What is your 
education level  
0=Never Went to 
School，1=At least 
elementary school，
2=At least middle 
school ，3=At least 
high school ，4=Some 
University or college，
5=Completed College 
or University 
 
A9 How many years 
have you been 
farming 
year 
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A10 Compared with 
other farmers, your 
ability of cultivation 
is better 
1=Strongly Disagree，
2=Moderately  
Disagree ，3=Agree，
4=Moderately Agree，
5=Strongly Agree  
 
A11 What is the total 
size of your 
household farm 
(Mu, allocated Land 
Use rights, 
excluding land 
rented in)  
mu 
 
A12 How much land do 
you rent in for 
agricultural use 
(total mu rented) 
mu 
 
A13 In general, how 
would you describe 
the current 
agricultural business 
in your area 
compared to last 
year 
1=GETTING WORSE, 
2=ABOUT THE 
SAME,3=GETTING 
BETTER 
 
A14 Please list the top 
five crops you have 
grown in the past 12 
months from the 
most valuable to the 
least valuable   
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
A15 Farm income yuan 
 
A16 Off-farm income yuan 
 
A17 Total income yuan 
 
A18 Productive 
expenditure 
yuan 
 
A19 Household 
Consumption 
expenditures (food, 
clothes, health, 
education, etc) 
yuan 
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A20 Other expenditures 
(e.g. car, house, 
vacation travel) 
yuan 
 
A21 Gross Incomes 
minus Expenditures 
yuan 
 
A22  To what extent you 
know about credit  
 
a. I have never heard of 
Credit 
b. I am aware of 
Credit, but am not sure 
of its purpose.         
c. I am very familiar 
with Credit 
d. I have applied credit 
 
A23  What's the purpose 
of credit 
a. Agricultural 
production                                  
b. House 
construction/renovation                      
c. Purchase of 
car/motorcycle/bicycle                
d. Household 
consumption                                
e. Medical expenses                                         
f. Education expenses    
 
A24  Based on the asset, 
income and loan, 
what do you think 
of your credit 
 
a. Very low, need more 
loan, have no 
repayment risk  
b. Relatively low, want 
to have more loan, 
have some repayment 
risk 
c. Enough, the loan 
could satisfy the 
production demand 
d. Relatively high, 
have repayment risk 
e. Very high, have high 
repayment risk 
 
A25  The importance of 
attributes of 
credit(from low to 
high  
1-5) 
a. Interest rate 
b. Term of loan 
c. Type of loan 
d. Type of repayment 
e. Institution 
f. Mobile Banking 
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To be answered by interviewer only 
  
3. In your opinion the respondent was engaged in this survey and answered truthfully 
all questions? Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  
____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
4. In your opinion the quality of answers provided in this survey is adequate to 
include in any written reports. Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  
____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
  
Please make any other relevant comments here
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Example of second-round Survey and Choice Experiment: Credit (Chinese) 
康奈尔大学，四川农业大学，西北农林科技大学，山东财经大学，中央财经大
学 
农村信贷调研农户问卷(“信贷”选择) 
 
 
采访者需告知受访者: 首先，感谢您花费宝贵的时间接受我们的问卷采访。此次
问卷采访需要花费您 20 分钟左右的时间。此次问卷调查是由中央财经大学，四
川农业大学，山东财经大学，西北农林科技大学，美国康奈尔大学针对土地流
转、作物保险、农村信贷合作科研项目发起的实地调研。 
 
我们承诺：调查只涉及科学研究，不涉及商业活动，并对获取信息保密。除此
之外，我们了解到您可能会对部分问题没有确切答案，在这种情况下，我们希
望您能做出合理猜测或预估。最后，我们尊重您不参与调查的权利。 
谢谢您的合作。祝您工作顺利，万事如意！ 
 
 
针对上述内容，您是否愿意参与此次调查 
是__________        否__________ 
若您不愿意参与此次调查，我们恳请您告知拒绝参与调查的原因： 
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采访者须知：如果受访者不愿参与调查，是担心本次问卷涉及到个人隐私，请
再次向其强调“本次调研完全匿名，并对获取信息保密，且您的参与对您们的调
查极为重要”。随后请再次确认受访者意愿。 
 
若受访者同意参与调查：非常感谢您的参与。下面我们将从询问您选择题开
始。 
 
 
 
镇（街）名称 _________________ 
村名                _________________ 
调查者            _________________ 
调查日期  _________________ 
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卡片 1：假设您有贷款需求，如果您只能从以下三种贷款中进行选择，下列哪一
个是您的选择（请在选项下方一栏中标出您的选择）并勾选您选择的肯定程
度。 
 
 贷款 1 贷款 2 贷款 3 
贷款利率 
10%  8%  2% 
还款期限 
5-30 年  0.5-1 年 0-0.5 年 
贷款类型 
信用贷款 
 
抵押贷款 
 
担保贷款 
 
还款方式 
一次性还清贷款 分期付清贷款 
  
分期付清贷款 
 
 
贷款银行 
中国邮政储蓄银行 
  
股份制商业银行  农信社 
 
手机银行 
否 
  
是 
 
是 
 
您的选择 
  
 
您的选择
肯定程度 
1   2   3   4   5 
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卡片 2：假设您有贷款需求，如果您只能从以下三种贷款中进行选择，下列哪一
个是您的选择（请在选项下方一栏中标出您的选择）并勾选您选择的肯定程
度。 
 
 贷款 1 贷款 2 贷款 3 
贷款利率 
8%  2%  6% 
 
还款期限 
0-0.5 年  0.5-1 年 3-5 年 
贷款类型 
抵押贷款 
 
信用贷款 
 
担保贷款 
 
还款方式 
分期付清贷款  一次性还清贷款  分期付清贷款 
 
贷款银行 
农信社 
  
股份制商业银行  中国邮政储蓄银行 
 
手机银行 
是 
 
否  否 
您的选择 
  
 
您的选择
肯定程度 
1   2   3   4   5 
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卡片 3：假设您有贷款需求，如果您只能从以下三种贷款中进行选择，下列哪一
个是您的选择（请在选项下方一栏中标出您的选择）并勾选您选择的肯定程
度。 
 
 贷款 1 贷款 2 贷款 3 
贷款利率 
10%  6%  12% 
 
 
还款期限 
0-0.5 年 1-3 年 3-5 年 
贷款类型 
信用贷款 
 
担保贷款 
 
抵押贷款 
 
还款方式 
分期付清贷款  分期付清贷款  一次性还清贷款 
 
贷款银行 
中国邮政储蓄银行 
  
股份制商业银行 农信社 
 
手机银行 
否  否  是 
 
您的选择 
  
 
您的选择
肯定程度 
1   2   3   4   5 
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卡片 4：假设您有贷款需求，如果您只能从以下三种贷款中进行选择，下列哪一
个是您的选择（请在选项下方一栏中标出您的选择）并勾选您选择的肯定程
度。 
 
 贷款 1 贷款 2 贷款 3 
贷款利率 
2%  10%  4% 
 
 
还款期限 
3-5 年  0.5-1 年 5-30 年 
贷款类型 
信用贷款 
 
担保贷款 
 
抵押贷款 
 
还款方式 
分期付清贷款 
  
一次性还清贷款  一次 性还
清贷 款 
贷款银行 
农信社 
  
中国邮政储蓄银行 
 
股份制商业银行 
手机银行 
是 
 
是 
 
否 
您的选择 
  
 
您的选择
肯定程度 
1   2   3   4   5 
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卡片 5：假设您有贷款需求，如果您只能从以下三种贷款中进行选择，下列哪一
个是您的选择（请在选项下方一栏中标出您的选择）并勾选您选择的肯定程
度。 
 
 贷款 1 贷款 2 贷款 3 
贷款利率 
12%  6%  4% 
 
还款期限 
3-5 年  0-0.5 年 1-3 年 
贷款类型 
抵押贷款 
 
担保贷款 
 
信用贷款 
 
还款方式 
分期付清贷款  一次性还清贷款 
 
分期付清贷款 
 
 
贷款银行 
中国邮政储蓄银行
  
股份制商业银行  农信社 
 
手机银行 
否  是 
 
否 
您的选择 
  
 
您的选择
肯定程度 
1   2   3   4   5 
 
 
                                                                 110 
                                                                
 
卡片 6：假设您有贷款需求，如果您只能从以下三种贷款中进行选择，下列哪一
个是您的选择（请在选项下方一栏中标出您的选择）并勾选您选择的肯定程
度。 
 
 贷款 1 贷款 2 贷款 3 
贷款利率 
10%  12%  14% 
 
 
还款期限 
0.5-1 年  5-30 年 3-5 年 
贷款类型 
信用贷款 
 
抵押贷款 
 
担保贷款 
 
还款方式 
一次性还清贷款 
 
分期付清贷款  一次性还清贷款 
 
贷款银行 
股份制商业银行  农信社 
 
中国邮政储蓄银行 
 
手机银行 
是 
 
否  否 
您的选择 
  
 
您的选择
肯定程度 
1   2   3   4   5 
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卡片 7：假设您有贷款需求，如果您只能从以下三种贷款中进行选择，下列哪一
个是您的选择（请在选项下方一栏中标出您的选择）并勾选您选择的肯定程
度。 
 
 贷款 1 贷款 2 贷款 3 
贷款利率 
8%  10%  4% 
 
 
还款期限 
1-3 年  0-0.5 年  0.5-1 年 
 
贷款类型 
信用贷款 
 
抵押贷款 
 
担保贷款 
 
还款方式 
一次性还清贷款  一次性还清贷款  分期付清贷款 
 
 
贷款银行 
股份制商业银行  农信社 
 
中国邮政储蓄银行 
 
手机银行 
否 
  
否  是 
 
您的选择 
  
 
您的选择
肯定程度 
1   2   3   4   5 
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卡片 8：假设您有贷款需求，如果您只能从以下三种贷款中进行选择，下列哪一
个是您的选择（请在选项下方一栏中标出您的选择）并勾选您选择的肯定程
度。 
 
 贷款 1 贷款 2 贷款 3 
贷款利率 
6%  14%  4% 
 
 
还款期限 
0.5-1 年  5-30 年 3-5 年 
贷款类型 
担保贷款 
 
信用贷款 
 
抵押贷款 
 
还款方式 
分期付清贷款  分期付清贷款  一次性还清贷款 
 
贷款银行 
中国邮政储蓄银行 
  
农信社 
 
股份制商业银行 
手机银行 
是 
 
是 
 
否 
您的选择 
  
 
您的选择
肯定程度 
1   2   3   4   5 
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卡片 9：假设您有贷款需求，如果您只能从以下三种贷款中进行选择，下列哪一
个是您的选择（请在选项下方一栏中标出您的选择）并勾选您选择的肯定程
度。 
 
 贷款 1 贷款 2 贷款 3 
贷款利率 
2%  10%  12% 
 
 
还款期限 
0-0.5 年  3-5 年 0.5-1 年 
贷款类型 
担保贷款 
 
抵押贷款 
 
信用贷款 
 
还款方式 
一次性还清贷款 
 
分期付清贷款  分期付清贷款 
 
 
贷款银行 
中国邮政储蓄银行 
  
农信社 
 
股份制商业银行 
手机银行 
否  是 
  
是 
您的选择 
 
 
您的选择
肯定程度 
1   2   3   4   5 
 
